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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

ERIC P. SWENSON,
Appellantf

Case No. 20020227-SC

v.
LYLE R. ANDERSON,
Appellee.

;
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
a. Issues.
1. Whether imposing sanctions and awarding fees for counsel,s
taking of a previous appeal amounted to an improper use of Ut. R.
Civ. P.f Rule 11 (Addendum, Exhibit 4 ) .
2. Whether the district court erred in finding counsel to be
in violation

of Rale

11(b)(1).

3. Whether the district court erred in finding counsel to be
in violation of Rule 11(b)(2).
4. Whether the district court erred in finding counsel to be
in violation of

Rule 11(b)(3).

All of these issues were preserved below. R. 1899-1968.

b.

Standard of Review.

Utah

appellate

courts

use a three-standard

approach

in

reviewing a trial court's Rule 11 findings: (1) reviewing the trial
court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard; (2)
reviewing the trial court's ultimate conclusion that Rule 11 was
violated and any subsidiary legal conclusions under the correction
of

error

standard;

and

(3)

reviewing

the

trial

court's

determinations as to the type and amount of sanction to be imposed
under the abuse of discretion standard* Bernard

v. Sutliff,

846

P.2d 1229, 1233-1235 (Utah 1992).
The Court's determination that Rule 11 was violated was based
on the case record and its construction and interpretation of that
record is ultimately a question of law that must be reviewed
without giving any deference to the trial court. Morse v.

Packer,

973 P.2d 422, 424-425, f 12 (Utah 1999).
The foregoing standards apply to all issues on appeal.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Rule 11 (Addendum, Exhibit 4) is a determinative authority in
this case. There is no determinative authority other than Rule 11,
although reference to civil rules, statutes and case law will
assist the Court in determining this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action pursuant to the federal civil rights act, 42
U.S.C. §

1983, et seg., concerning the exclusion of Native

Americans from the jury selection process in the Seventh District
2

Court for San Juan County. Enforcement proceedings were brought in
1997 because the Utah Judicial Council (hereafter, Council) was out
of compliance with a consent decree. An appeal was taken regarding
three matters. One involved the liability of one Seventh District
judge.

A second question pertained to that judge's request for

sanctions. A third involved plaintiff's request for attorneys fees
from the Council.

The questions of fees and sanctions were

remanded to the district court.

On remandf the district court

ordered plaintiff's counsel to be sanctioned and awarded attorneys
fees to the district court judge. Plaintiff's request for fees was
denied.
B.

An appeal is taken only from the award of sanctions.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Pursuant to an Agreement of Parties (Addendum, Exhibit 1, R.
648-657) (hereafter, Agreement), an Order and Decree

(Consent

Decree)f R. 678-679 (Addendum, Exhibit 2), was entered in 1996.
The Agreement

and

Consent

Decree resolved

claims

of racial

discrimination and other violations by the Council regarding the
exclusion of Native Americans from the jury list in the Seventh
District Court for San Juan County, Utah. Id. at 648-649•
In 1997f plaintiff initiated a contempt and enforcement action^fc£h#h>\S
alleging that the Council and a Seventh District Judge, Honorable I
Lyle R. Anderson, had violated the consent decree and/or aided and J
abetted the Council in the violation of the Agreement and Consent I
Decree. R. 684-725.
On September 22, 1998, the trial court granted a motion to
strike the allegations against Judge Anderson. R. 1185-1189. The
3

order followed a ruling from the Bench on August 14, 1998, R. 1600,
Pages 3-8.

The district court, the Honorable David Roth, denied

the Judge's motion for Rule 11 sanctions. Id.

Plaintiff filed an

amended motion on October 13, 1998, R. 1256-1307, and proceeded to
trial in December, 1998 on claims against the Council.
Following trial, Judge Roth entered Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions Of Law And Judgment. R. 1555-1566.
Plaintiff took an appeal from the order granting the Motion to
Strike as well as from an order denying costs and attorneys fees.
R. 1588-1589.

A cross appeal was taken regarding the denial of

Judge Anderson's Motion for Sanctions. This Court determined all
pending issues on appeal. See Crank v.

Utah Judicial

Council,

20

P.3d 307 (Utah 2001) (hereafter referred to as Crank I ) .
This Court overturned the district court's ruling denying
plaintiffs' requests for attorneys fees from the Judicial Council
and remanded the question for further determination. Crank I, 20
P.3d 307, 316-319, 11 38-43. This Court upheld Judge Roth's ruling
denying sanctions under Rule 11(b)(1) by affirming the trial
court's finding that counsel acted in good faith.

Issues under

Rules 11(b)(2)-(3) remanded for consideration by the district
court. Crank I,
C.

at 20 P.3d 303, 316, H

33-34.

DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT ON REMAND

On remand, the district court denied plaintiff fees against
the Council. R. 2057-2069 (Addendum, Exhibit 3, ruling).
issue is not on appeal.

This

The district court also ruled that

plaintiff's counsel must be sanctioned under Rule 11 and ciwarded
4

Judge Anderson partial attorneys fees. Id. at 2065-2069.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
No factual findings regarding the alleged violations of Rule
11(b) (1) - (3) were made based on new evidence.
evidence

adduced

on

remand

came in the

form

The only new
of

affidavits

pertaining to fees and costs. No evidentiary hearings were held.
The

district

court

awarded

sanctions

based

solely

on

its

construction and interpretation of the.1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Employing Rule 11 sanctions for counsel's taking the

appeal in Crank I was an improper use of Rule 11.

The appellate

rules provide for sanctions for frivolous appeals and only this
Court can impose such sanctions. This Court did not find that the
appeal in Crank I was frivolous.

The presumption that counsel's

improper motive was substantiated by the taking of the first appeal
violates the rule against irrebuttable presumptions and has no
basis in the record.
An award of attorneys fees was inappropriate.

Sanctions in

the form of attorneys fees were inappropriate because they were
imposed as punishment and not as a deterrence, as required by Rule
11(c)(2) . Awarding fees was particularly inappropriate where there
were disputed issues of fact involving whether there should be fees
1

However, memoranda submitted by Judge Anderson attempted
to supplement the factual record in the same way that it was
attempted in Crank I. R. 1740-1819; see also Appellants Reply
Brief. Crank I., Pages 1-4; 20-23. However, it is clear that the
same record used by Judge Rothf and this Court in Crank I, is now)
the only proper record which can be used to review the district)
court's imposition of sanctions on remand.

imposed, the amountf the hourly rate and other factors placed into
issue by counsel's affidavit on remand*
Fees should not be awarded for the first appeal because it
operates to chill the right to appeal erroneous lower court
decisions.
lawyers

Rule 11 should not be used as a weapon to intimidate

who

bring

controversial

lawsuits

for

poor

and

underprivileged clients.

Counsel should be protected from this

abuse of judicial power.

This is especially important for the

future rights of Native American jurors in San Juan County because
the Council, with the assistance of Judge Anderson, is once again
using jury lists which exclude Indian jurors.
2. Sanctions are not appropriate under Rule 11(b)(1) because
counsel had a proper purpose in bringing the action against Judge
Anderson.

The proper motive was to effectively respond to the

improper exclusion of Native Americans from the jury selection
process in San Juan County and to address the judge's role in that
process.

The district court, Judge Roth, and this Court in Crank

I, upheld the finding that counsel had no improper purpose.

This

is the law of this case and to contradict these rulings is error,
flki applying Rule 11(b)(1), the district court violated this Court's
mandate on remand which required the district court to limit the
issues to those in Rules 11(b)(2)-(3). Moreover, it was error for
the district court to impose sanctions on the basis that an
improper purpose was presumed from the taking of the first appeal
in Crank

I

and that counsel's use of a ruling in a separate

criminal case likewise presumes an improper purpose.
6

3. Counsel made a claim against Judge Anderson that he aided
and abetted the Council's violation of the Consent Decree. A claim
against a non-party for aiding and abetting a person or entity who
is violating a court order is universally recognized by many
jurisdictions*

This is a viable claim presenting a plausible

argument based on reasonable research that cannot be a basis for
sanctions under Rule 11(b)(2),
a*

The elements of this claim are:

A non-party acts in concert with and in privity with a

party to a court order;
b.

The non-party has notice of the order.

c.

A party to the court order is violating the order.

d.

The non-party is aware that the party is violating the

order.
e.

The non-party acts or fails to act with the purpose of

aiding and abetting the party in its violation of the Order.
Counsel's research into this area of the law amounted to a
reasonable

inquiry

reflecting

the

law

and,
of

based
other

on

the

record

jurisdictions,

and
was

the cases
objectively

reasonable.
Counsel also made claims that the judge directly violated the
Agreement

in two respects, that using lists which improperly

excluded Native Americans violated the Agreement, 1 4 and by
violating

f

violations.

8,

which

prohibits

constitutional

or

statutory

These are plausible claims because there is also

language from the Consent Agreement and Decree which arguably runs
the force and effect of the injunction to non-parties who are
7

acting in concert with the Council.
In

addition,

counsel

made

a

good

faith

argument

that

application of the theory underlying the aiding and abetting claim
against Judge Anderson found in cases in other jurisdictions should
be extended to the law in Utah.

It was objectively reasonable for

counsel to rely on the plain meaning of the terms of the Agreement
and Consent Decree. This Court in Crank I implicitly acknowledged
the validity of counsel's legal theory using Utah statutory law.
This means that plaintiff's legal theory comports with existing
Utah law. Rule 11 is not a fee shifting statute and its use in the
manner employed by the district court is contrary to the rule in
civil rights cases that attorneys fees may not ordinarily be
awarded to prevailing defendants.
4.

Rule 11(b)(3) cannot be a valid basis for imposing

sanctions because counsel presented a proper factual basis in
support

of

the

legal

claim,

including

verified

pleadings,

affidavits of witnesses and expert witnesses and a wealth of jury
data and other facts about the jury selection process.

The

question of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the clciims was
not made by Judge Anderson in the original motion, not addressed by
plaintiff or counsel, and not considered or ruled upon by Judge
Roth in his initial ruling finding sanctions were inappropriate.
The issue was raised by Judge Anderson for the first time on
appeal.

Such a claim has been waived.

Moreover, under Rule 11(c), counsel must be given notice of
the claim and provided an opportunity to cure the alleged defect,
8

which was not done in this case*

The process that concluded with

counsel,s sanction violated this rule*
due process concerns.

This also raises serious

In Crank I, this Court, while noting that

the facts were insufficient, did not hold that there were no facts
alleged at all, and did not intimate in any fashion that sanctions
for inadequately
sanctions*

alleged

facts could be a proper basis for

There are numerous factual allegations in the record

and there was a factual showing on plaintiff's most important
theory underlying the aiding and abetting claim that was adequate
to

avoid

sanctions.

contradictory dicta

Moreover,

there

was

confusing

and

in Crank I that the district court adopted on

remand as a basis sanctions about the factual allegations that was
mixed with claims that plaintiff never made*
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
Imposing sanctions on counsel for taking the appeal
in Crank I was an improper use or Rule 11* Awarding
fees as punishment and not for deterrence was improper*
Sanctions must not be used to chill the right of
appeal and intimidate lawyers bringing public
interest litigation*
a* Sanctions for appeals should be reserved
to the appellate courts*
The district court imposed sanctions under Rule 11(b)(1) on
the basis that counsel's taking of the first appeal in Crank

I

demonstrates improper purpose. R. 2068-2069. Employing sanctions
for counsel's taking of the appeal and awarding appeal fees in
Crank
Cooter

I was an improper use of Rule 11 by the district court.
& Gell

v. Hartmarx

Corporation,
9

496 U.S. 384, 405-409

(1990); see also Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure.
Civil 2d, § 1336.

In Cooter,

the Court said "[on] its face, Rule

11 does not apply to appellate proceedings." Id. at 406,. The rule
only applies to events occurring in the district court. Id.

The

Court said:
Neither the language of Rule 11 nor the Advisory Committee
Note suggests that the Rule could require payment for any
activities
outside
the
context
of
district
court
proceedings....We believe Rule 11 is more sensibly understood
as permitting award only of those expenses directly caused by
the filing, logically, those at the trial level." Id.
The Court reasoned that the expenses related to the appeal are
directly caused by the district court's sanctions and the appeal of
the sanctions, not by the initial filing in the district court. Id.
at 407. The Cooter

Court's reasoning should be persuasive because

it construes a rule similar to Utah's. See Barnard

v. Sutliff,

846

P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah courts look to federal case law to develop
its interpretation of Rule 11).
Rule 11 is not a proper basis for a district court to sanction
conduct occurring on the appeal level because that function is
expressly reserved to the appellate courts. Appellate courts can
impose sanctions for frivolous appeals. See Rule 33, Ut. R. App. P;
Featherstone

v. Schaerrer,

34 P.3d 194, 207 n. 11, 1 38 (Utah 2001)

(appeal fees denied by appellate court as proper exercise of
court's discretion); Pennington

v. Allstate

Ins.

Co.,

973 P«»2d 932,

940-941 (Utah 1998) (sanctions imposed by district court under Rule
11, fees for frivolous appeal imposed by Supreme Court under Rule
33).

In Cooter,

the Court said: "The Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure place a natural limit on Rule 11's scope." Cooter
10

& Gell

v. Hartmarx Corp.,

496 U.S. 384, 407. The Court did not approve of

the district court's award attorney fees to the appellee:
...even when the appeal would not be sanctioned under the
appellate rules. To avoid this somewhat anomalous result
Rules 11 and 38 are better read together as allowing expenses
incurred on appeal to be shifted onto appellants only when
those expenses are caused by a frivolous appeal, and not
merely because a Rule 11 sanction upheld on appeal can
ultimately be traced to a baseless filing in the district
court. Limiting Rule 11's scope in this manner accords with
the policy of not discouraging meritorious appeals. Id. at
407-408.
A frivolous appeal is one that is "...not grounded in fact,-<|/\jU ^^
nor warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith **rA*
^te>

argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law." Rule 33(b);
see also Gildea
(Utah 1998).

v. Guardian Title

Co. of Utah,

970 P.2d 1256, 1272

In Crank I this Court did not find that the appeal

V*

ill*

{{fr\

% v*

was frivolous despite the request from Judge Anderson that the
Court impose Rule 33 sanctions. See Judge Anderson's Appeal Brief,
Crank

I.

Pages 28-30.

The sanctions imposed on counsel are

therefore improper because the district court used Rule 11 to
circumvent

the appellate process where this Court, at least

implicitly, had rejected sanctions for the appeal.
And finally, Appellant is mindful that this Court issued a
mandate on remand for the district court to consider appeal fees,
including the judge's fees. Crank I, 20 P.3d 307, 319, 44 & n. 17
(citing Valcarce

v.

Fitzgerald,

961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998)).

The Court did not consider the Cooter

rule, a rule that may be

especially appropriate in a case where the judiciary and the
district court are the subject of the action.
applying Cooter's

Thus, cases not

well-reasoned principles, such as
11

Valcarce,

,UA

&~

4>

should no longer be the rule.
b. Fees awarded as punishment conflicts with Rule 11's
purpose of deterrence.
An award of attorneys fees was inappropriate.

Judge Roth

determined that there would be no sanctions in this matter and
specifically found that Attorney Swenson acted in good faith. See
Point Two, infra.

The Supreme Court upheld this finding« Crank I,

20 P.2d 307, 316, H 32.

This is significant because although

improper purpose may amount to a violation of a subsection of Rule
11 (Rule 11(b) (1)), improper purpose appears not be the controlling
factor

in

determining

the

type

of

sanctions.

Apparently

recognizing this concept, the Supreme Court stated that awarding
attorneys fees is not a mandatory sanction. Id. at 316, 1 22.
Rather, Rule 11 states: "A sanction imposed for violation of
this

rule

repetition

shall be limited to what is
of

such

similarly situated."

conduct

or comparable

sufficient
conduct

to deter
by

others

Rule 11(c)(2). The rule further states that

if the violation is raised on motion, attorneys fees can be* awarded
as "...warranted for effective deterrence." Id. The trial court is
not required to assess attorneys fees, but if it does it may do so
"...only to the extent necessary 'to deter repetition of [the
inappropriate] conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated.'Utah
Schaerrer,

R.

Civ. P.

11(C)(2)

(2001)."

Featherstone

v.

34 P.3d 194, 208, I 41. Thus, the main purpose of Rule

11 is to deter not compensate. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure, Civil 2d, § 1336. Rule 11 cannot be used as a fee
\j

shifting statute. Id.
12

Deterrence was not the district court's basis for awarding
fees.

The district court's ruling emphasized counsel's motives

throughout the opinion.

E.g., R. 2067-2068.

Counsel's alleged

improper motivation, and particularly the improper purpose alleged
to have been established by the taking of the first appeal, was the
only basis for the district court's award of attorneys fees. R.
2068-2069; see also R. 2068 (the purpose of the award is not to
compensate but to impose sanctions). The sanctions were therefore
punitive in nature. No other reason was given supporting the type
of sanction that was imposed.
^

The district court never specified that deterrence was the X0 \ V6
basis for an award of attorneys fees. No findings were made at all
regarding the deterrent effect of fees.

Thus, the district court

violated the rule's requirement that it "...explain the basis for]
the sanction imposed."
Griffith,

985

P.2d

Rule 11(c)(3); see also Griffith

255, 258, I

10

(Utah

1999).

This

v.
is

particularly important for the proper administration of Rule 11.
Id.

The district court's authority to award fees is reviewed for

an abuse of discretion. JDd. (citing Barnard
1229, 1233-1235).

In Crank,

v. Sutliff,

846 P.2d

the district court failed to make any

findings at all regarding deterrence as required by the rule. No
evidence was presented on this issue.

The fee award should

therefore be set aside because Rule 11 was not applied properly.
c. The district court failed to properly resolve
disputed issues of fact.
An award of attorneys fees was especially questionable in
light of the disputed facts evident in the record that were not
13

^

resolved by the district court with an evidentiary hearing prior to
imposing sanctions. By affidavit, counsel raised questions about
the amount of fees claimed, the alleged hourly rate and other
documentation presented in support of a high fee request. See
Declaration of Attorney Eric P. Swenson, R. 1957-1963. Given this
conflict in the facts, awarding fees without allowing discovery and
a full evidentiary hearing was error.

There should have been a

full evidentiary hearing to make Judge Anderson's lawyers prove up
the alleged basis for their fees and to clear the air about the
whether they were being entirely candid with the Court about their
hourly rate. This would have been in accordance with the district
court's obligation to independently analyze the reasonableness of
the requested fees. United

Pac.

Ins.

Co. v.

Durbano Constr.

144 F.R.D. 402, 409 (D. Utah 1992) (quoting White
Corp.,

v. General

Co.,
Motors

977 F.2d 499, 501 (10th Cir. 1992)).
d.

Fees should not be awarded for the first appeal
because it chill's the right of appeal of
erroneous lower court decisions. It may also
imperil the rights of Native American jurors by
obstructing enforcement of the Consent Agreement.
Fees should not be awarded for the first appeal because it
operates to chill the right to appeal erroneous lower court
decisions. Imposing sanctions in the form of fees as was done here
for taking the first appeal is contrary to the rule that sanctions
should only be reserved for the most egregious cases, "'lest there
be an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower
court decisions.'" Taylor

v. Hansen,

1998) (quoting Porco v. Porco,

958 P.2d 923, 931 (Utah App.

752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988)
14

and followed in Hudema v. Carpenter,

989 P.2d 491, 503 n. 14 (Utah

App. 1999)).
Allowing the district court to use Rule 11 to impose appellate
fees operates to obstruct and intimidate litigants.

This problem

was addressed by the United States Supreme Court:
Limiting Rule 11's scope in this manner accords with the
policy of not discouraging meritorious appeals. If appellants
were routinely compelled to shoulder the appellees' attorney's
feesf valid challenges to district court decisions would be
discouraged. The knowledge that, after an unsuccessful appeal
of a Rule 11 sanction, the district court that originally
imposed the sanction would also decide whether appellant
should pay his opponent's attorney's fee would be likely to
chill all but the bravest litigants from taking an appeal. See
Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1040 (CA6 1988) ('Appeals
of district court orders should not be deterred by threats [of
Rule 11 sanctions] from district judges').
Moreover,
including appellate attorneys fees in a Rule 11 sanction might
have the undesirable effect of encouraging additional
satellite litigation....It is possible that disallowing an
award of appellate attorneys fees under Rule 11 would
discourage litigants from defending the award on appeal when
appellate expenses are likely to exceed the amount of the
sanction. There is some doubt whether this proposition is
empirically correct (citations omitted)
as Rule 11 is not
a fee shifting statute, the policies for allowing district
courts to require the losing party to pay appellate, as well
as district court attorneys fees, are not applicable. 'A
movant under Rule 11 has no entitlement to fees or any other
sanction, and the contrary view can only breed litigation
(citation omitted).'

Cooter

& Gell

v. Hartmarx

Corp.,

496

U.S. 384, 408-409.
The district court's ruling in Crank is out of step with the common
sense view in Cooter

that sanctions on the district court level

under Rule 11 must not usurp a function reserved to the appellate
courts.
That decision-making employing only the benefit of hindsight
can have undesirable effects on counsel is problem that had
confronted the federal courts in reviewing fee applications in
15

civil rights case*

How this problem has been dealt with may be

instructive to this Court in the Rule 11 context.

Awarding the

attorneys fees to a prevailing defendant under the fee provision,
42 U.S.C. § 1988, is extremely rare, even for theories that some
may regard to be frivolous or pretty far out. Jane L. v.

Bangerter,

61 F.3d 1505, 1513-1517 (10th Cir. 1995).
In Jane L, the Court said that a district court should avoid
the "understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by
concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail,
his action must be unreasonable or without foundation.

This kind

of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight
claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate
success." Jane
Christiansburg

(1978)).
claim

in

L.

v.

Bangerter,

Garment

Co.

61 F.3d

v. E.E.O.C.,

1505, 1513

(quoting

434 U.S. 412, 421-422

Thus, no fees were awarded against counsel for making a
Jane

L

that

Utah's

abortion

law

violated

the

constitutional proscription against involuntary servitude because
one judge and a preeminent legal scholar supported such a claim.
Jane L, at 1514-1515.
What the district court actually did in Crank conflicts with
the reasoning in Jane L because it engaged in post hoc reasoning in
using Rule 11 to award fees because one litigant prevailed and the
other did not. This is not Utah's Rule 11 standard. Rule 11 is not
a fee shifting statute, although the district court in Crank
apparently used the rule in this fashion to make an award to a
prevailing party under the guise of sanctions.
16

This is improper.

A

"1 ' ,rii iipy; "iiiiki1 plausible arguments based on case precedents and

other

legitimate

source

evertheles*

ind

themselves on the losing end of a count's decision.
I

: laced

became the standard

in dire straits

1

hindsight

logic

imposing

"ii civil rights cases, defendants often threaten sanctions
ar? ulleinpl

counsel. Rule

operates more heavily

against controversial lawsuits ana
rprivileged clients
position to manipulc

Judges ai

>articularly good

iudicial process by engaging

threatening conduct

>i> •, ,:. shouia oe

attorney is protected from the abuse of judicial power
making

legitimate

IIi

judiciary

involved

questionable activities involve issues of race.
I

i »II p inception rather than the usual rule.

This principle is

especially important lur Uie 111111114 • iif" i CPIIIPIII of the rights of
Indian jurors in San Juan County now that the Council has announced
i1-,

tihi

" ,|

,

iolating the Consent Decree by using jury

lists which unlawfully exclude Native Aim-i i •tu,",, f'.ei.' I! 2095-2098.

2

Studies have indicated that threats ot sanctions operate
more heavily against civil rights litigants. Vairo, Rule 11i A
Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D, ]89, 200-201 (1988); Rule 11 in
Transition: The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 69 (1989), cited in Burbank, The
Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11,
137 U. Pa. L Rev, 1925, 1938 (1989); Comments on Rule 11 of the
Federal Rule, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (1991)
(Submitted to the Committee on Rules and Practice of the Judicial
Conference of the United States).

POINT TWO
There is no basis for sanctions under Rule 11(b)(1).
(a)

Counsel's purpose is apparent from the record.
The district court misconstrues this record.
Its decision is therefore clearly erroneous.

Rule 11(b)(1) is violated if an action is "...for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of the litigation."
motion

for

sanctions, Judge

Anderson

In his original

submitted

no

evidence

establishing counsel's improper purpose, see. Motion, R. 1001-1029;
Consolidated Reply, R. 1059-1079, other than providing materials
relating to the Estrada

case. Estrada

question of motive, as argued, infra.

has no bearing on the
Thus, it is clear that an

improper purpose, if any there be, can only be imputed to counsel
from other portions of the record.
Counsel's legitimate purpose is apparent from the record,
particularly the lengthy pattern of discrimination against Native
American

jurors evident in San Juan County's

jury selection

history. An attorney whose purpose is to stop this discrimination
is properly motivated. Properly addressing the exclusion of Native
Americans from jury service has always been counsel's motive. The
district court's presumption that the record reveals an improper
motive, a motive supposedly confirmed by the taking of an appeal,
is an inaccurate characterization of the record. This construction
of the meaning of the record constitutes clear error.
Counsel's purpose is proper and apparent from the record:
Native Americans were grossly under represented on jury
18

at

timesi

indeed,

for

most

- • o Agreement)

They

(1932-1996);

N\

improperly excluded
-

l.liis l a s t

| milt, ti j \ i

A m e r i c a n I n d i a n s w e r e n o t prest'iM
(Exhibi

of

A l t h o u g h a S e v e n t h Dislii'-i

I21>H Uti4

in ?0ll,\ It.

iitufi

century,
S e e R. 657
Il| li

| I W
1

.

095-2098.

I

system

t o b e di s c r i m i n a t o r y i.ii .197 4 and issued a writ uf h a b e a s c o r p u s
a

'i i in II nl « ii

, ...

148 , -~238a-240a, t h e

Smith, U

of N a t i v e A m e r i c a n s c o n t i n u e d . C r a n k Vhu> I i
this continuing
riie

In

exclusion
iddress

problem.
i Hpr esonl.aLiiii

1

Utah's

judiciary,

the

Utah

J u d i c i a l C o u n c i l , and t h e S e v e n t h D i s t r i c t J u d g e s ,
a n t e r e d into
tcK. •, Consei
seg.

injunction,

igreeing

reforms

which

would

grant

selection. Id.; s e e , e.g.,
5 4

N a t i v e A m e r i c a n jur

652

xt

•! tri al

c

Crank,

Consent Agreement w i t h

nrHn

court

652-654

ii " M s h

(Agreement,

status

retained jurisdictioi

I I 11 Court's mandate

(Consent Decree) ,

I

wax:

(Agreement)

I i1.. backgrounc

JLLL

79
& motive

for what he did, since with the filine ** * ue Consent Decree
a ."ufil i Dili ii |

I'i I i gat: ion

to m o n i t o r

» i enforce the Agreement

behalf of the class. See Duran v.

on

JL*^-

1496 (10th Cir. 1989).
] ii In,".!; I h.in

'

'ouncil broke i ts promise by

creating jury lists which excluded Native

of

the Agreement. In order to implement the violation, a judge had to

assist the Council by actually using the lists*

Using the lists

and thereby completing the jury selection process would effectively
lock out those Native Americans who should have been on the lists.
The person who performed this role was the Seventh District Judge
who was operating and managing the jury selection system on the
district

court

level, Judge Lyle R. Anderson.

It was Judge

Anderson's acts and omissions while engaged in this process that
aided and abetted the Council in violating the court ordeir. There
were facts supporting the judge's culpable role which were apparent
to counsel. See Point Four, infra.

Enforcement proceedings were

required in order to make Utah's judiciary live up to its word.
Contempt proceedings were also brought against the only district
court judge who was using the deficient jury lists, operating and
managing the jury selection system for the Council on the district
court level, including qualifying and disqualifying individual
jurors, assisting the Council in implementing and monitoring the
jury system and its compliance with the Agreement, and, in 1997 and
1998, implemented the Council's violation of the court order by
aiding and abetting the Council's violations by using bad jury
lists. Id.
It was the use of the bad lists excluding Native Americans
that was at the center of the controversy.

If the lists had not

been used, this action would not have occurred. There was an easy,
quick and inexpensive method of revising the lists to bring them up
to the required percentages of Native Americans.
known

as

supplemental

sampling.
20

Supplemental

This process is
sampling

is a

ematical
which

procedure

known

i

t:he Council

proportiona

and

copulation

divisio;

County

Judge

Anderson

f re r "i**-.

census

iu« up wit

opulation

a

• 1 «. county,

24
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Dennis Willigan Sixr

(Di

he Council had a

staff employee who could have easily undertaken this procedure
i' r J 111.11 iil-i 11 , "" HIPI-MI(l plaintiff unsuccessfully tried
his expert at no charge for this
never

used.

Eventually,

the

admi

volunteer

sampling was
Council

hrough

its

attorney,

oer and efficacious process, H. IfiOO,

Pages 17-19.

Despite the ready availabil

I* uml ui.n

fix, the lists,, which were documented to a mathematical certainly
I o have excluded

cant numbers of Native Americans,

were used anyway.
?

The district court based its decisior
counsel s taking
2067-2069.
t

Imhi«.

mpose sanctions on

Judge Anderson claims.

The sanctions were accordingly limited

I i1/

« ii. appeal

and post-appeal.

Judge

a

Anderson, claim

dismissal of

while

pursuing

contempt

chaj

Judicial Council.
This Court commented

ompelled

Council to now lake its obligations seriously:
seems

'

'There i ,s J

perfectly good reason wli / ij.'i appea.
the

' • • iii"

Crank's

second

suit has

the

""""|xj,ti this case
instilled

heightened degree of circumspectness
the procedural details of the Agreement," Crank

i certain
*herenc

~

- :

* >
[

38, 317, n.14. As was the case with the Councilf counsel's motive
in

regards

to

Judge

Anderson

was

to

make

the

judge

take

discrimination against Native American jurors seriously as well.
It is evident from the record that the right of Native
Americans to be on jury lists in certain numbers is something that
Judge Anderson never took seriously•
against him*

This prompted the action

The judge felt he could ignore the minimum standards

for inclusion of Native Americans on jury lists by using lists that
contained insufficient numbers of Indian jurors.
The judge's use of the bad lists was documented in one
criminal case in the Seventh District and provided an example of
exactly how he aided and abetted the Council in the use of lists
which improperly excluded Native Americans, State

v.

Estrada.

There, Judge Anderson was apprised that the jury lists did not have
the minimum numbers of Indian jurors required by the Agreement and
should not be used.

The lists excluded approximately 148-168

Native Americans who were supposed to be on the lists in 1997, R.
1260, and approximately 132-155 Native Americans who were supposed
to be on the lists in 1990. R. 1263.
Judge Anderson was asked to strike the lists and not use them.
He refused.

R. 694-696; R. 776-783; see also R. 1602, Page 60.

Judge Anderson made it clear that the numbers on the lists were
acceptable because he was not bound by the standards of the Consent
Decree, R. 696, and in fact would not use the Agreement's criteria
for inclusion of Indian jurors. R. 1602, Pages 59-60.

Judge

Anderson's actions established two conflicting standards, one for
22

I In'1 judiciary's administrative body

f

hat prepare the lists foi his

use and the othe;

1 y to himself as the only

judge using the lists

Q

County jurj

That Judge Anderson

97

ases took this double

standard to heart

r * therefore,

lesser numbers nt Indian jurors) tha-.
iudiciary

Judxcxax LOUU

ise threatened the right

Americans to participate fair.

Native

orocess,

9*v. s purpose i ^ the action against Judge Anderson and
takxny

protect Native American jurors

preventing the judge from legitimizing less*
jury lists

and thereby

set himself

apart

ndians
from

standard

requiring idijei iT'iimb"" i »„ "l I ml i,in jurors that was agreed to for
the Seventh District• See Appellant#s Opening Brief, Crank 1. ,,
Appellants Reply Brief, Crank I,r

Pages
The dxsx^ ,

i

established by his ;.
*

indicative

I I "I I

counsel

the Estrada

case

motive,

Estrada

is

improper purpose sine
the

judge aided

Agfeemenl

and abetted

Moreover, the Estrada

Roth considered sai

Pages 11-14.

improper purpose

* probative
- demonstrated *

the Counc...
case was in the record when Judge
assumed that he considered

and rejected the argument that an improper motive was
t

t

was being used.
Counsel's purpose IM1 MIUM |H ipwi in n en ; rpspect because i t

stems from the continuing cycle of diminished presence

lati v e

Americans on the jury lists that, despite notice and the ready
availability of an easy fix, bespeaks of purposeful discrimination*
That the conduct continued once all concerned were on notice was an
aggravating factor the Court could take into account in imposing
contempt sanctions. This continuing pattern of exclusion of Native
American jurors and the judge's role in that exclusion was termed
flagrantly

racist.

Although

this

language

was

repeatedly

referenced by the district court in its ruling imposing sanctions,
it was an appropriate means of describing the judge's conduct that
persisted despite notice that it was wrong.
A person who continues unlawful conduct, such as the continued
use of the bad jury lists after having been placed on notice, is
committing wilful and egregious acts. The record bears this out.
See

R. 692-693

(notice to Judge Anderson); 685-688; 690-692

(continued use of lists while Judge Anderson was acting in privity
with the Judicial Council); R. 694-696 (Judge Anderson's rcsfusal to
take corrective action despite being placed on notice).

Counsel's

research disclosed law that held that continuing wrongful acts
after having been placed on notice bespeaks of intentional racial
discrimination as a matter of law. See Appellant's Reply Brief,
Crank I. Pages 16-17. That judge's continuing conduct after having
been placed on notice constitutes wilful racial discrimination as
a factual finding was attested to by an expert in an affidavit. Dr.
J. Dennis Willigan Seventh Affidavit, R. 1146-1148, I 49, Pages 2325.

This accounts for the characterization that the judge's

conduct was flagrantly racist.

Thus, counsel's statement about
24

y racist conduct does not indicate
because

i

**" was made

Improper purpose
ludge's

overall

participation in institutionalized racism.
IIy I li« I '"• the- enforcement and contempt motion was filed in
September,
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luciye Anderson

involving defendants

I »iiJ

trials

ncluding some Native Americans, who were
.,,1 ,, wr . n » fundamentally defective because

unaWcl

they improperly excluded Indian jurors
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II", d'MI l/'JI

I l< i

I if i l l s

'*<* iolation of the Agreement by the

Counc

*a^avated by the sustained use

of the discriminatory lists by Judge Andersons in l*i :„ - .|jei a, 1 i.ni .in. I
management of San Juan's jury system on the district court level.
Counsel
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apparent from the

•

ounsel had an eye to

Drobleir
for

ssn

adopting
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deficient lists.

while

Counsel was motivated lo correct the problem
roblem

,s proper

using

the future

every respect - .

Thai counsel's purpose
Leceii! M>y F^nttt where the

Council provided notice that its jury lists are, once again, In
Agreement. K. •» 0 M S - } 0c* '

i i s t. s w i th deficient

numbers of Native Americans are nuw nr,,,'| ,...

|

Seventh

:including

Aiitlet yum

District
11

Court

for San Juan County,

ie
Judge

iii n'vcli* f discrimination that motivated counsel

years ago remains all too ;•.,..

present.

(b) The district court's opinion conflicts with
prior rulings that counsel had a proper
purpose. The use of Rule 11(b)(1) violated
the mandate of this Court in
Crank

J.

There is nothing in the record that documents counsel's
alleged improper purpose. See Point 2(a), supra.

However, there

are rulings by the district court, affirmed by this Court, which
held that counsel's purpose was proper.

The district court was

obligated to not only give great weight to these rulings but to be
bound by them as well.

That the district court ignore the effect

of these rulings constitutes clear error.
The district court, Judge Roth, found that counsel had no
improper purpose. This Court upheld this finding. Crank I, 20 P.2d
307, 316, 1 32. That counsel had a proper purpose throughout the
case at the trial level is supported by Judge Roth's expression of
his feelings in talking to the attorneys as he announced his
decision from the bench at the end of the trial:
The first thing I would like to say is that in my opinion from
what I have seen of this case and during these last two days,
I believe that on both sides of this case the parties are
properly motivated and well intentioned. Both trying to solve
a similar problem but doing it in different ways from
different prospective. And while I agree and disagree with
both of you to some extent, I don't see any villains in this
courtroom. R. 1645, Page 395.
The pronouncement of an experienced trial judge who had been in
this case for five years and had first-hand exposure to the
evidence and contentions of the lawyers, expressed some five months
after the denial of sanctions, where he could find nothing bad to
say about anyone, and was only complimentary, should have been
given great weight by the district court.
26

Indeed, a ruling of a

propeii inn | M i, .I I1

I he district court that is affirmed by this Court

is the law ol the case.
(Utah 1988

250

failure :. abide ivy these favorable rulings is
reviewed by this Court without

giving any deference
"(| ''-1 4 24-425, 1 1/"

*2d
The sanctions are in error and must therefore

overturned unu>

standard. Id.

The district court's ruling also violates the rema
Court.

The district court

remand must

follow the

mandate ot the appellate

'his

Court ordered the district court to m a k e determinations regaraj.
i

^

Rule

11(b)(1) w a s not

included in the mandate* oee Cranic
"I H
i II

M'he reason i r- this is that Judge Roth, and then this Court
"i diik

11(b) ( I

that counsel acted I.II quod taith.

aes b y finding

Thi

ii

" ,i

h 'iiled iM^^ ifiqfc

that Rule 11(b)(1) may be the basis for sanctions, see Point One,
'""!" II • ii'i'i1" i: -

supra,

* ($2^
J$^Pr\

i 'i I -i in any other w a y b e used

remand.
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POINT THREE
k u x e 21(b)(2) is not a valid basis for sanctions
because the claims were viable, based on Utah l a w o r
the law from other jurisdictions. Counsel also had a
plausible argument based on objectively reasonable
research of claims that w e r e an extension,
modification o r reversal of existing l a w
or the making of n e w law.

Rule 11(b) (2) states ,""

\AerfAlfA

I he claims, defenses a n a

emi it en I i ni«. therein are warranted by existing law
z/

_

ion

frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law*"

This places the

legal viability of the claims against Judge Anderson at issue.
There were three claims: (1) that Judge Anderson aided and abetted
the Council in its violation of the Consent Decree; (2) that Judge
Anderson

violated

the

Consent

Decree's

provision

regarding

inclusion of Native Americans in the jury lists, set out in ! 4 of
the Agreement and (3), that Judge Anderson violated the provision
regarding compliance with the constitution, laws and regulations,
J 8 of the Agreement.

Judge Roth addressed the last two claims,

ruling that there was no cause of action for violation of the
Agreement. R. 1185-1189 (order); R. 1600, Pages 3-8 (ruling from
bench) .

Judge Roth focused only on the question of the legal

sufficiency
allegations.

of

the

claim

and

did

not

address

the

factual

This Court ruled on claims involving the alleged

violation of the Agreement.

Crank I,

20 P.3d 307, 314-315.

Counsel's primary claim is that Judge Anderson, as a nonparty, aided and abetted the Council in its violation of the
consent decree.

The elements of this claim are:

a. A non-party is acting in concert with and in privity with
a party to a court order;
b.

The non-party has notice of the order.

c.

A party to the court order is violating the order.

d.

The non-party is aware that the party is violating the

order.
e.

The non-party acts or fails to act with the purpose of
28

abetting t h e party In its v i o l a t i o n of the O r d e r .
JS

.^itier +™ bring

aspect of

«i

" " ' * : lg

theory that counsel had t

abstantiate

contempt
ordei

Il a :i :i n,

mportant

vhether a

violation of /i

ourt's

>earch revealed that there is a claim that
l/JlMJv^

against - .on-party for aiding and abetting a person or entity who
— —

-

•—•

i.es a court o r d e r .
by many jurisdictions.

•

- — — — • — _

I^MA^I

§

This principle is universally recognized
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Despite IInt universal accepi

theory, neither' Judge Roth or this Court in Cranfc I ever addressed
this claim
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argument f infra
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.strict court in turn focused only on the
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\greement.
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basis for sanctions, particularly where the district court failed
ibetting claim. See R. 2057-2069
(ruling)*

.4J,«,

*...i« mistakenly consi i III-"- > n» i M

a <= r* legal conclusion that constitutes clear error.
i

ii

Accordingly,

i correction of error standard
3

„

Judge A n d e r s o n also did not address t h e aiding and abetting
c l a i m o n remand. R. 1744-1819 (memorandum); u„ 2022-2032 (reply
memorandum).

* ^>

review. Bernard

v. Sutliff,

846 P.2d 1229, 1234-1235.

It is apparent that Judge Anderson's culpability under aiding
and abetting principles is an arguable point.

Plaintiff claimed

that the judge, as a non-party, acted in concert with and in
privity with the Judicial Council in aiding and abetting the
Council's violations of the Consent Decree.

There were facts

alleged which support this claim. See Point Four,

infra*

The right of a court to hold a non-party in contempt for
aiding and abetting a party who is violating a court order is well
recognized throughout the United States. This considerable body of
law was repeatedly referenced in various plaintiff's memoranda.
^\See, e.g., Plaintiff's Opening Supreme Court Brief.Crank I.
/

17-23.

Pages

In this one brief alone counsel found support for this

widely accepted principle of law in an opinion of the United States
Supreme Court, three cases from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
a Sixth Circuit opinion, and a Second Circuit case. See Id. Many
other federal cases were also cited, including district court cases
in Alabama, Pennsylvania and Virginia.
exhaustive of this area of the law.

These cases are hardly

Thus, it can be said that

enforcement actions against non-parties who aid and abet a party
who is violating a court order involve a legal principle* that is
black letter law.

See also Wright and Miller, Federal Practice &

Procedure, Civil 2d, § 2956.
Liability for aiding and abetting a party who violates a court
order is therefore a plausible argument.

A plausible argument is

not frivolous. Barnard

857 P.2d 917, 970 (Utah

v. Utah State
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Bar,

1993 \

jciven

tax

t h e aiding and abetting claim

viewed a s a good

argument

existing law, t h e

claim complies with Rule

t*

:•4

Counsel need only show that his research into t h e i
facts Is "objectively reasonalil
Taylo

Hansen,
»' i if i

nilci

ill I I I i

< rinnstances,"

958 P.2d 923, 930 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting
ft (If., p 2d 1 2 2 9 , 1 2 3 6 ) .

C o u n s e l need not come

the correct conclusion; he need only
inquiry. Id.; see also Barnard

UtaL

I

..** , tu,

„>UL*.

P.2d 93

Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil 2d^ „
1335.
easonable inquiry and research by counsel in Crank produced
a WF

although not

Utah, that supported the
contemr
order.

*

ion-parties being heio

aiding and abetting a party's violation of

Counse

interpret

was at least plausible
920,

theory

Barnard

filing
v

iii.dli State

Bar,

85 i

T h u s , reliance o n the case law from many other jurisdictions
a'/on^f l«i

meets t h e test that t h e reseai*.:!. WJL. JIJJP*..111 I1,1"

fact that years later t h e Supreme Court denied liability does
IHHII

I il II in i' i nif'iiiiK in I in I mi nt sanctions.
The language in Utah procedur*

*

l

20-921.

i|j|inrl "i

nloi i-iiiem! I

orders against non-parties:

an "[injunction] shall b e binding only upon the parties t o the
action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and
a t t o r n e y s , and upon persons in active concert or participation
with them w h o receive notice in person o r through c o u n s e l , o r

otherwise, of the order," (Emphasis supplied).
Relying on the plain meaning of this provision is objectively
reasonable*
The Agreement of the Parties has language which arguably runs
the reach of the injunction to non-parties:
The Agreementf f 12, states: "This Agreement of Parties, and
tv* iv ~ 1 any Order of the Court, shall be binding on the heirs,
v^ tf ~~^ successors, and assigns of the parties hereto, including
r vK pU
any courts of general jurisdiction that may succeed the
^\y
present Seventh District Court For San Juan County." R. 656.
*c
(Emphasis supplied) .
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v

It was objectively reasonable for counsel to rely on this language.
The Agreement/ f 4(a), requires a jury reform plan and bestows
discretion to implement the plan on the Council and
"...those acting for and in its behalf...". (Emphasis
supplied).
It was objectively reasonable for counsel to rely on the plain
meaning of this language.
The Agreement, I 8, states:
"Defendant/ and all those acting in concert with it, shall/ in
regards to jury selection procedures and activities in the
Seventh Judicial District Court for San Juan Countyf abide by
all
applicable
lawsf
regulations, and constitutional
provisions." (Emphasis supplied).
It was objectively reasonable for counsel to rely on the plain
meaning of this language.
The Agreement, f 13, provides that the court shall retain
jurisdiction

to enforce compliance with the Agreement.

The

Agreement refers to "parties" in the plural when dealing with
compliance.

This can arguably include Judge Anderson because he

was a party at the time the settlement was negotiated/ as well as
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b e i n g , through h i s attorney f a signatory to the A g r e e m e n t .
objectivel.

.

""' w a s

"i "i " I I •

T h e Consent Decree also h a s language w h i c h arguably implicates
i i >ii - p a r t i e s :

•

•

• • i.«11 i j i . :

"file C o n s e n t Decree, Ill \

"The Defendant U t a h Judicial C o u n c i l , its a g e n t s , o f f i c e r s ,
s u c c e s s o r s and a l l persons acting in concert o r participating
w i t h i t , a r e hereby ordered t o comply w i t h t h e provisions of
t h e A g r e e m e n t of P a r t i e s . " R 679. (Emphasis s u p p l i e d ) .
Il I

I i <"" Ill1")

I

meaning

mi easonable for counsel

t h e s e documents In formulating

rely o n t h e plain

i III -i j.

I
l II

ISH

especially w h e r e t h e language so closely follows t h e provisions

A l t h o u g h b o t h Judge Roth
interpretation
plain tiff's

of

the

a

™

Supreme Couz I luiiruseni

parties'

::::] a :i iris fa i 3 ecij

Agreement

"

the 1 a ng m lage oi

holding
me

that

Agreement

and

Consent Decree^wajs^iiQt the only leqaX-JAeory^jin^ claim use< I 1: j
plaintiff.

J.U W « ^ reasonable for counsel

the many cases

applying the process of enforcing court orders aga. *st non-parties
whic-

ore

found^in

the

jurisprudence

oughout^ the United States.
T]fa

of _other

jurisdictions

This is appropriate where there is

^ <-ase 1 aw on,, the r

law but

there is law from other jurisdictions, sanctions are inappropriate.
Sorensen,
viev
law

i,
h

1

1228 (Utah 1996)

("In

.. ^s u in J I
• cannot hold that the t r i a l c o u r t w a s required
onduct

the standard set

910

** "he Bar

i
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*

* «- ****i* counsel fell below

reasonable inquiry in the form of research that produced case law
of other jurisdictions, demonstrates that Rule 11 was not violated.
Most telling, the Supreme Court on appeal in Crank implicitly
acknowledged the validity of plaintiff's legal theory that nonparties can be held in contempt of court.

The Court said,

"Clearly, a trial court has the power to hold non-parties in
contempt if those parties conspire to frustrate a lawful order of
the Court."

Crank I, 20 P.3d 307, 314, I 25. The Court arrived at

this conclusion by using existing Utah statutory law, Utah Code
Ann.

§

78-32-1(9)

(unlawful

interference

with

process

or

proceedings of court); Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1(5) (disobedience of
lawful judgment or order), but did not actually refer to the aiding
and abetting claim.

In discussing the sufficiency of the factual

allegations regarding what this Court thought was an allegation of
an interference with the Agreement, Crank 1, 20 P.3d 307, I 29, the
Court again implicitly acknowledged, in a general way, the basis
for plaintiff's claim, referring to it this time as a conspiracy
theory. Id. at 315, f 30. This supports plaintiff's argument that
no violation of Rule 11(b)(2) occurred because the claims were
based on existing Utah law.
The Supreme Court's implicit acknowledgement in Crank of the
basic legal theory and principle underpinning claims against nonparties negates any basis for sanctions under Rule 11(b)(2) because
the claim is warranted under proper construction of existing Utah
law. See Crank I,

20 P.3d 307, 314, f? 24-25.

Rule 11(b)(2) is

also complied with because plaintiff's theory, if it does not come
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within the statutory language used by this Court, amounts to a good
faith argument for the extension of the law or even the making of
new law.

This is perfectly in line with the cases from other

jurisdictions which apply the aiding and abetting principle. See,
e.g., Regal

International
Lines,

Inc.,

Knitwear

Co.

Brotherhood

v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14-15

of Teamsters,

etc.

(1945);

v. Keystone

Freight

123 F.2d 326, 329 (10th Cir. 1941).

The foregoing research and plain meaning of language in the
settlement documents and orders is in contrast with the district
court's ruling that Rule 11(b)(2) was violated because counsel
never made an argument to extend, modify or reverse the law or
establish new law. R. 2067.

The Court's conclusion is apparently

based on the ruling that counsel made only one claim, a claim that
the judge had violated the Agreement which contained no duty
applicable to the judge.

Counsel made the claim that Judge

Anderson, while in privity with and acting in concert with the
Council, aided and abetted the Council in its violation of a court
order. This claim was not based, as the district court incorrectly
assumed, on what Judge Anderson could or could not do in complying
with or abiding by the Agreement.

It was based on what the judge

did do or did not do that aided and abetted the Council.

This

Court reviews the district court's legal conclusions under a
correction of error standard. Barnard

v. Sutliff,

846 P.2d 1229,

1234-1235. No deference is given to the trial court's conclusions
of law. Morse v. Packer,

973 P.2d 422-425, 424, f 12. The district

court's failure to take into account a particular claim and the
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ntn

legal

theory

and

supporting

case

law underlying

this

claim

constitutes clear error on a question of law. The decision based on
clear error should be overturned. See Id.
POINT FOUR
Rule 11(b)(3) is not a basis for sanctions because the
claims had proper evidentiary support. Sanctions cannot
be imposed where counsel was not provided with timely
notice and an opportunity to cure the alleged
factual inconsistencies•
Rule 11(b)(3) requires "the allegations and other factual
contentions

have evidentiary

identified,

are

likely

support

to have

or, if

evidentiary

specifically
support

so

after a

reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery."
The district court imposed sanctions based on insufficient factual
allegations and in so doing relied on language in this Court's
opinion in Crank I. R. 2068.
Judge Anderson in his initial trial motion never provided
notice

that

he was

seeking

sanctions

for deficient

factual

allegations. See R. 1001-1029, 1059-1079 (Motion For Sanctions,
Memoranda); R. 763-788 (Motion to Strike, Memorandum).

He relied

only on Rule 11(b)(1) (improper purpose) and Rule 11(b)(2) (claims
must be warranted by existing law, etc.). Neither counsel nor the
trial court were apprised of any claim regarding the sufficiency of
the facts under Rule 11(b) (3).
Judge Roth never addressed a sufficiency of the evidence
allegation in the motions to strike and for sanctions when ruling
from the bench. See Order, R. 1185-1189.

Rather, Judge Roth

limited his decision on the Motion to Strike to a construction of
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the Agreement of Parties and his ruling on the sanctions motion to
counsel's good faith. Id.
Rule 11(c) requires that any motion for sanctions "describe
the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b)."

On

appeal Judge Anderson for the first time raised the issue of the
facts in Crank I.

Plaintiff complained about Judge Anderson's

attempt to improperly supplement the record on appeal with new
facts. Footnote 1, supra;
J, Pages 1-4.

see also Appellant's Reply Brief, Crank

This gave counsel no opportunity to address the

question on the trial level by curing the alleged defects or
withdrawing the pleading.

Under such circumstances, courts are

reluctant to allow new issues to be raised for the first time on
appeal. See State

v. Anderson,

789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990) (court

cannot consider new arguments made for the first time on appeal).
Because the question of the sufficiency of the factual allegations
was not presented with the specificity required under Rule 11(c),
Rule 11(b)(3) is not an appropriate basis for sanctions.
In addition, the failure at the outset to provide notice of
alleged insufficient pleading of the facts raises serious due
process concerns that counsel was not afforded a fair opportunity
in the district court to respond or cure the alleged defects.
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d, § 1337;
see also Hutchinson

v. Pfeil,

208 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000).

Following appeal on remand it was, of course, too late to cure the
alleged factual insufficiencies and change the record.

Imposing

penalties well after the time when the alleged factual deficiencies
37

could have been properly addressed at the outset if proper notice
had been given also does not square with this Court's ruling that
due process and the opportunity to be heard are mandeitory when
sanctions may be imposed. Crank I, 20 P.3d 307f 314, II 25-27. It
also does not square with the rule that more stringent due process
standards may become applicable where, as seen in Crank on remand,
the sanctions move from compensatory to the punitive end of Rule
11's spectrum, as was the case in Crank, see Point One,

supra;

Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d, § 1336.
The

Court

in

Crank

said

that

there

were

no

concrete

allegations that the judge conspired with the Council or that he
hampered the Council's compliance efforts.
315, f 29.

Crank I, 20 P.3d 307,

The Court also said that the motion instituting the

action against Judge Anderson "...did not provide any sworn facts
that indicated a violation of the Agreement or an attempt to
interfere with its implementation."

Id. at 315, I 29.

These

pronouncements pertained to claims that plaintiff never made (i.e.,
hampering and interfering).4

The decision mentioned conspiracy,

also a claim that was never made.5

Despite the fact that counsel

4

Interference with a court order may be a contempt of court.
see, e.g., United States
v. Shipp,
203 U.S. 563, 575 (1906).
However, it was never alleged that the judge sought to interfere
with the Council's compliance with the court order.
5

A conspiracy between the Council and the Judge was never
alleged, nor is it essential to the claim that the Council violated
a court order and that the judge helped them do it. A conspiracy
alleged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires an agreement or some
understanding between a private party and a state actor to deprive
someone of a constitutional right under color of state law. See,
e.g., Dixon v. City of Lawton, Okl.f 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 n. 6 (10th
Cir. 1990). Crank is a Section 1983 case and the use of the term
38

never made such claims, the district court parroted this Court's
language, imposing sanctions because there were no facts supporting
a

claim

of

interfering

pronouncements

about

or

claims

hampering.
that

R.

Crank

2068.

counsel

never

made

I's
were

unnecessary to the Court's ruling on the substantive issues and
should therefore be viewed as dicta.
City,

See Callahan

125 P. 863, 864-865 (1912); OXY USA, Inc.

F.3d 1178, 1184-1185 (10th Cir. 2000).

v.

v.

Salt

Babbitt,

Lake
230

To the extent this Court

led the district court astray by steering it to consider the issue
of factual allegations outside the context of claims actually made,
this Court should set matters straight and not allow sanctions to
be imposed.
What little was said in Crank I about the facts did involve a
claim plaintiff
Agreement.

did make about an alleged violation

of the

Although this Court in Crank I found that the factual

allegations were not concrete, it did not say that no facts were
alleged at all. The Court's pronouncements about the facts did not
specifically mention the aiding and abetting claim.

Nor did the

Court identify and discuss the specific facts alleged in sworn
pleadings and affidavits as they bear on the aiding and abetting
claim. There are specific facts supporting this claim, as argued,
infra.

Under these circumstances, it was clear error for the

district court to rely on this Court's pronouncements as a basis
for sanctions.
Plaintiff's

allegations were

supported

by

affidavits of

"conspiracy" to describe plaintiff's claims is misleading.
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witnesses attesting to first-hand knowledge of facts, including
facts and opinions by plaintiff's experts. This factual showing is
quite detailed.

In addition to the arguments and facts made

directly about Judge Anderson, additional issues and facts were
raised about the Council which also implicated Judge Anderson.
This certainly illustrates that counsel was carefully dealing with
the facts as they relate to his legal theory of the case.
This is not a case where allegations were made with no evidentiary
support at all.

Far from it. The district court did not consider

or give any weight at all to the following factual allegations that
supported plaintiff's aiding and abetting claim and that the
Agreement had been violated:
- The Motion For Order to Show Cause, R. 684-725. The Motion
is Verified.

At the very outset, the motion clearly states that

its objective is to appoint a receiver to implement the Agreement,
obtain an order enforcing the Agreement, and requests an Order to
Show Cause for contempt sanctions for violating or aiding and
abetting the violation of the Agreement and Consent Decree.

The

Motion describes the Agreement and background of the case and
depicts the role of the Judicial Council and Judge Anderson and
alleges that they are in privity and acting in concert. Id. at Page
2.

The requirement of the Agreement that Native Americans are to

be included in certain numbers and the jury selection process are
described in detail. Id. at Pages 3-5. The deficient numbers of
Native Americans on the 1997 lists are described and documented in
detail in terms of actual numbers and by the use of percentages,
40

called disparities. Id. at Pages 5-7.

Affidavits of experts

provide additional documentation for these verified allegations.
See Seventh Affidavit of Irene Black and Sixth Affidavit of Dr. J.
Dennis Williqan. Verified allegations further state that there were
10 jury trials conducted by Judge Anderson in 1997, identified by
case name and docket number.

Motion.

Pages 7-8.

Fourteen

additional jury trials for 1997 to be conducted by Judge Anderson
were identified as upcoming, Id. at Pages 8-9.
deficient

jury

lists was provided

Notice of the

to the Council

and Judge

Anderson. Id. at Pages 9-10. Conversely, notice of the violations
to the Court required under the Agreement was not provided. Id. at
Page 12.

Despite notice having been given by plaintiff, the

violations continue. Id. at Pages 10-11. The verified allegations
then specify the facts of Judge Anderson's aiding and abetting the
Council's violations. Id. at Pages 11-12. These include using the
lists; concluding the jury process with jury trials and other
procedures which permanently locked out the Native Americans who
should have been on the lists but were not; failing to provide
notice and warning to those involved in the jury selection process,
including parties and their attorneys in pending cases and the
jurors in the class in Crank and class counsel; renouncing the
Agreement and refusing to apply the Agreement's standards during
the

qualification

discriminating

and

trial

process;

against Native American

and

by

jurors.

intentionally
The verified

allegations further document, through plaintiff's expert, Dr. J.
Dennis Willigan, that fixing the lists and curing the violations
41

can be done quickly and inexpensively. Id. at Page 12; see also Dr.
J.

Dennis

Williaan

Affidavit,

f

14.

Notwithstanding

the

availability of easy means to fix the problem, the Council and
Judge Anderson did not employ any of them, or any other. Jd. at
Page 12.

The plaintiff documents reasonable but unsuccessful

efforts to resolve the alleged violations. Id. at 12. The Motion
details the relief requested, including setting the matter for
hearing; entering preliminary and permanent injunctive relief;
appointing a receiver to implement compliance; issuing an Order to
Show Cause for Contempt; the imposition of standard contempt
sanctions, including fines, jail sentences and damage awards to the
class; and awarding plaintiff his fees and costs. Id. at Pages 1314.
Motion's

Supporting

Memorandum,

R.

726-740.

The

memorandum discusses the facts in detail. Memorandum, at Pages 1-5.
Previous documentation is incorporated which bears on the current
controversy, including Dr. Willigan's Third and Fourth Affidavits.
Id. at Page 4.

In the Statement of Law, the Court's enforcement

authority is discussed. Xd. at Pages 5-7. The Memorandum discusses
the duties of the Council and Judge Anderson. Id. at Pages 7-8. The
Memorandum provides authority regarding enforcement and contempt
against non-parties who are in privity and in concert with parties
while aiding and abetting violations of court orders. Id. at Pages
7-9. The violations are then discussed in more detail. Id. at Pages
10-13.

The remedies sought by plaintiff are set forth. Id. at

Pages 13-14.
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Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion For
Order to Show Cause, R. 1100-1154.

The Council submitted a

Response to the Verified Motion which included affidavits from
Judge Anderson and an attorney with the Court Administrator's
Office, Brent Johnson. See Council's Response, R. 796-861.

The

Reply includes Dr. Willigan's twenty seven page Seventh Affidavit.
Dr.

Willigan

provides

considerable

detail

in

refuting

the

allegations made by Judge Anderson and Attorney Johnson.

Dr.

Willigan's

the

findings,

as

an

expert

sociologist,

include

observation that given the statistical data that presents clear
statistical

evidence

that

racial

bias

is present

and which

documents the under representation of Native American jurors which
placed those in the jury selection process on notice, with those
responsible having deliberately chosen to not utilize "a readily
available, cost-effective solution (e.g., supplemental sampling) to
promptly remove the racial bias, but rather opt for an alternative
solution

that

offers

no

immediate

relief,

taking

years

to

implement, and which rests on an administrative foundation which is
characterized by it's proponents as '...not likely [to] be easily
maintained,' a sociologist such as myself would normally be led,
ceteris

paribus,

to report

evidence

supporting

a finding of

intentional racial discrimination." See Affidavit, Pages 23-25.
Thus, an expert, upon carefully analyzing the evidence and data,
including

facts

discrimination.

implicating

Judge

Anderson,

found

racial

The Memorandum further discusses the facts and

violations. Memorandum,

at Pages
43

1-5.

The

facts underlying

defenses asserted, including good faith, attempts to fix the
deficient lists, and other matters, including questionable claims
and allegations by Attorney Johnson, are thoroughly refuted. Id. at
Pages 5-11. In addition, false and misleading statements by the
judge and attorney are discussed in light of Dr. Willigan,s work.
Id. at Pages 11-14.

In regards to evidence presented by the

Council, through Judge Anderson, that it is in compliance for the
year

1998, plaintiff

allegation.

Id.

at

provided

a thorough

14-16. The

refutation

Memorandum

further

of this
discusses

plaintiff's allegations of constitutional violations which are
brought into the Motion because compliance with the Const]Ltution is
mandated by the Agreement, 1 8. Id. at Pages 16-20.

Judge

Anderson's role in jury selection is discussed. Ld. at Pages 20-21.
Remedies sought by plaintiff are identified, including mandating
supplemental sampling to immediately resolve the problems. Id. at
Pages 21-22.

In addition, a transcript of portions of the

Estrada

case are provided in support of the allegations implicating Judge
Anderson. 3Jd. at Exhibit B.
Dr. Willigan submitted an eighth affidavit. R. 1215-1253.
This

affidavit

documents

the

continued

exclusion

of

Native

Americans from the jury lists in 1998, confirming that 132-155
Indian jurors were not included on the lists. Id. at Page 4, I 15.
Dr. Willigan provides additional demographic data which bears on
the alleged violations. Id. at Pages 5-6 and provides an opinion
that

the

presence

of

Indian

jurors

diminished." ^d. at Page 6, f 18.
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has

been

"substantially

Expert Reports. Dr. Willigan submitted an expert report
and a supplement to that report.

The Council through its expertf

Mr. Hachmanf submitted a report. Both experts testified at trial.
Both experts discussed the facts in detail.
Plaintiff's Amended Motion. R. 1256-1307. Documentation
submitted with the Amended Motion included the Affidavit of David
Bancroft, further documenting the numbers of Native Americans on
the jury lists; the Eighth Affidavit of Dr. Willigan; and August
14, 1998 Hearing Transcript. The Motion asked, inter

alia,

that the

Court construe the Agreement and/or amend the Consent Decree to
address the conflicting jury list standards created by Judge
Anderson's ruling in the Estrada

case. Motion, at Pages 15-16.

The Council filed a Motion to Strike Dr. Willigan's
Seventh

Affidavit.

(memorandum).

R.

1157-1158

(motion);

R.

1159-1164

Plaintiff responded. R. 1165-1178 (memorandum).

Plaintiff's Response discussed the basis for Dr. Willigan' work in
detail and its admissability. There was no ruling on this Motion.
The
requesting

Council

that

filed

plaintiff

be

a

Motion
denied

for

Protective

discovery.

R.

Order

789-793.

Plaintiff responded. R. 1086-1099. The facts and the need for
additional fact finding were discussed.

Discovery was eventually

allowed, but did not include Judge Anderson. E.g., R. 1344-1345
(stipulation extending discovery).
Partial Summary Judgment Motion on Plaintiff's Amended
Motion,

Memorandum.

R.

1364-1366

(Motion);

R.

1367-1430

(Memorandum) . Attachments included the Court Docket Index; Brent
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Johnson Deposition Transcript; Affidavit

of Attorney Swenson;

August 14, 1998 Hearing Transcript; and the Council's Judicial
Protocol.

Judge

Anderson's

continuing

role

in the

alleged

violations is discussed in plaintiff's supporting memorandum, at
Pages 22-24.
Stipulation. R. 1445-1446.
stipulation.

The parties entered into a

The parties stipulated to the numbers of Native

Americans on the 1997 and 1998 jury lists. The Council admitted it
did not file annual reports. The Council admitted that it did not
request from the trial court an extension of time in which to come
into compliance with the Agreement.

The Council admitted that it

did not employ supplemental sampling in 1997 and 1998.
-

Plaintiff took the depositions of Attorney Johnson and a*

computer specialist with the Court Administrator's Office, Mr.
Yoshinaga. Both deponents discussed the facts at length, including
facts which implicated Judge Anderson.
The foregoing is illustrative, although not exhaustive, of the
role the facts played in this litigation. This was ignored by the
district court in imposing sanctions. The district court's ruling
is

essentially

a

legal

conclusion

because

it construes

and

interprets the pleadings and other documents in the record.

It

should be reviewed for legal correctness, giving the court no
deference. Morse v.

Packer,

973 P.2d 422, 424-425, I 12.

Under

this standard, the district court's gross misconstruction and
misinterpretation of the facts in the record is clear error.
Despite the considerable detailed factual allegations that
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were often fact-specific to Judge Anderson's alleged role in aiding
and abetting the violations, it is significant, and troubling in
light of the sanctions that were imposed much later in the case,
that Judge Anderson never timely raised the question of the
sufficiency of facts.

There are procedural devices to do so.6

Rather than do this, Judge Anderson did exactly the opposite. He
filed a Motion to Strike which admitted the facts.7

Given Judge

Anderson's admission of the allegations, it is understandable that
he would not then turn around and challenge the facts or attempt to
introduce evidence.
It is also understandable that plaintiff's counsel would not
address factual insufficiencies, other than to point out, in the
context of the Motion to Strike, that it is an inappropriate remedy
to resolve factual issues that may be at issue in a case where the
facts are so abundant, detailed and very specific as to key issues.
See Plaintiff's Opening Supreme Court Brief, Crank I, Pages 28-30.
The judge's failure to address this issue up front now places
counsel in the difficult position of having had to deal with the
question well after the fact without having been afforded the
chance

to

be heard

or to take action to cure

the alleged

6

See Rule 12(e) (motion for more definite statement); Rule 56
(summary judgment). If there was a question about the sufficiency
of the facts, the trial court would have afforded plaintiff a
chance to amend the factual allegations. Sawyer v. County of Creek,
908 F.2d 663, 665-666 (10th Cir. 1990).
7

See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure; Civil 2d,
§ 1380; Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 516 (1959); Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 952 F.Supp. 1362, 1395 (D.C.Minn.
1997).
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deficiency. As argued, supra,

this is contrary to the process set

out in Rule 11(c) which requires notice, with specificity.

It is

also raises grave due process concerns. Given the important role
that the numerous substantial factual allegations played throughout
this case that were specific to Judge Anderson, it was clear error
for the district court to misconstrue and misinterpret the record
in levying sanctions for insufficient factual allegations under
Rule 11(b)(3).
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the judgment and order of the trial
court and remand the matter to the trial court for a dismissal of
all claims against Attorney Swenson.
Dated this 9th day of July^2efl2>.

^

^

c^c^Sr

—•

Eric P. Swenson
Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Eric P. Swenson, Appellant, hereby certifies that he did mail
two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief to the attorneys
for Appellee, as follows: to the attorneys for Judge Anderson,
Robert L. Anderson and Daniel G. Anderson, Anderson and Anderson,
P.O.
2002.

Box 275,

Monticello,^J0t£h,

8^535-^ t h i s

Eric P. Swenson
Appellant
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Eric P. Swenson, # 3171
P.O. Box 940
Monticello, Utah 84535
Telephone: (801) 587-2843

lEVENTODISTRICTCOURT
^an.lnanCountv

Jensie L. Anderson, # 6467
American Civil Liberties Union
of Utah Foundation, Inc.
# 9 Exchange Place, Suite 715
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-9862

^MAY131996

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SAN JUAN COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LOREN CRANK, JR.,
Plaintiff,
|

v.

AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES

UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
Defendant.

Civil No. 9307-26
Judge Roth

The parties desire to settle this litigation by entering into
this agreement. It is therefore agreed and stipulated as follows:
1«

This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging that the Defendant and others acting in concert with the
Defendant have committed acts and omissions which have resulted in
the improper exclusion of Native American jurors in the District
Court for San Juan County, Utah.
acts

and

Plaintiff maintains that these

omissions violate the Fifth,

Sixth

and

Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, comparable provisions

of the Utah Constitution, and applicable lavs and regulations of
the State of Utah-

Defendant denies these allegations. There is

a real and actual controversy between the parties in connection
with such matters. This Court has jurisdiction over this action
and the parties hereto.
2.

The following constitute agreed facts:

a.

Mr« Crank is an adult Native American resident of

Montezuma Creek, San Juan County, Utah, and an enrolled member of
the Navajo Tribe of Indians.
b. Navajo, Paiute, and Ute Native Americans in San Juan County
constitute a cognizable group.
c. Native Americans have been represented on jury lists used
in and for the Seventh Judicial District Court in the numbers and
in the disparities listed in the documents attached to this Order,
Judgment, and Decree as Exhibit A.
d.

The following definitions are incorporated into this

Agreement;
The Master List is the merged juror-source list used by the
Utah Judicial Council.
The District Court Questionnaire List is the juror-list for
the San Juan county District Court which is sent by the Judicial
Council VIA the Court Administrator's Office to the Clerk of Court*
The Clerk then sends qualification questionnaires to the persons on
that list.
The Qualified List contains those San Juan jurors who are on
the Master List and the District Court Questionnaire List and have

2

been through I,In-.* 'qualification process and found to be qualified to
serve as trial jurors i n the San Juan foiinl y District Court.
"

'-Trial Juror Venire is the list of San Juan County

Court

District

jurors who are summoned to appear and participate in'the jury

selection process in. individual tri a 1 s«
Trial Venire is the final list of San Juan County jurors who
are selected "h

HHIVI?

as trial jurors'in a specific case.

' The foregoing facts and definitions H I e admissible only for
the purpose of enforcing or modifying this agreement on for' the
purpose of enforcing our modifying the "orders of this Court in this
case.
1.

This case is maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule

2 3 i c« k k (b)('^i 1)1; the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure*
so numerous that all ctf its members'cannot be

The class is

ji iiiieii hrieiii

there

are common' questions of law and fact applicable to the class, and
the claims o,l Plaintiff aii»i typical of the claims of the class.
Plaintiff has alleged that the Defendant has acted

upon

|rounds

generally applicable to the class, which alleged facts, if true,
would make appropi j aic» final injunctive relief with respect to the
class'as a whole.
class
respecl

would

create

-Separate actions by individual
i risk

t;„o the I iicll vl.cii

establish

incompatible

of

inconsistent

membei H mf tlm?

adjudications

with

members of the'class and would, in turn,
standards of conduct

l!oi

Line Defendant

Plaintiff shall represent a class of present and prospective San
Juan County la/ti v e American jurors. Notice of this agreement shall
be provided to the class as follows:

3

a*

The proposed decree, this agreement, and a statement that

any member of the plaintiff class may file a written statement of
objections with the Clerk of Court on or before a date set by the
Court, which counsel recommend be approximately 45 days after this
agreement is filed with the Court, shall be posted within three
days after the Court so orders as follows:
(i) Plaintiff shall post the documents at the Navajo Chapter
Houses for those units of Navajo local government serving the Utah
Portion of the Navajo Reservation* Plaintiff shall also post said
documents at a suitable community meeting place located within the
Dte Mountain Ote Reservation at White Mesa, San Juan County, Utah*
(ii) Plaintiff shall also provide notice by causing the terms
of this Agreement and the proposed Order of the Court to be
presented at meetings of the aforementioned Chapters.
(iii) The Defendant shall provide notice by posting a copy of
this Agreement, the proposed decree, and the Notice to Class at the
office of the Clerk of the Seventh District Court for San Juan
County, and at the other offices of the Clerk of Court in the
Seventh District, and the San Juan County Attorney's Office.
Defendant shall also post notice of this settlement by advertising
this Agreement, Notice to Class and the proposed decree in a
newspaper of general circulation in San Juan County for a period of
one month. Notice shall also be accomplished by advertising in the
Navajo tribal newspaper. The Navajo Times.
(iv) Plaintiff and Defendant shall file proof with the Court
that they have done the foregoing in affidavit form within 10 days

4

after said acts have been completed•

Any objections should be

heard by the Court on t fiitp In IM» sot by I lie i oui I , which i-otmsel
recommend by 60 days after this Agreement is filed with the Court*
1
that

Defendant shall formulate and implement a plan to assure

Seventh

District

Court

Turors

aio

rho&fii

Irani

sources

reflective of a cross section of the community of San Juan County,
Defendant

and

those

acting

for and

in

its

behalf

will

have

reasonable discretion to under tako u1! ions iiml implement policies
which will comply with the goals of this paragraph and any plan
filed pursuant

LJ this paragraph.

The plan, inter alia, shall

include the fol 1 urn i HCJ:
a.

The names on the District Questionnaire Lists provided to

the Seventh District Court pursuant to the plan shall be within on
average, plus oi

IIIIIUS,,

" |it• i

L'IMII

1 I he estimated percentage of

adult Native Americans in San Juan County in any given year^
requirement

shall

be

practicable, ami no
recognize

that

implemented

LiiLei

there

may

as

UMM .lanuary
be

soon
Jl

"

is
19 9',

administrative

th

This

reasonably
fhe parties

difficulties

in

implementing the provisions of this sub-paragraph and that the
Defendant may fot quod t-atuu petit ion t lie Com I for an extension of
time in which to bring the jury lists into compliance.
resorting

to

further

litigation, the parties

Pi ior to

shall engage

in

reasonable discussions to resolve then differences informally.
b.

The

plan

shall

provide

for

the

use

ol

a

juror-

qualification questionnaire which shall be adequate^ lo determine
the qualifications of the -jurors.

5

c*

The plan shall provide for the collection and proper use

of demographic data sufficient to comply with applicable statutes
and regulations*
d. The plan shall provide for the identification of jurors on
the Qualified Lists by name, address, and race.
e.

The plan shall also provide for the routine use of

compulsory process and sanctions which are available under Utah
state law or as may be available pursuant to any agreement with the
Navajo or Ute tribes to encourage compliance by jurors with jury
selection

procedures*

The parties

recognize, however, that

compulsory process is not currently available*
f • Nothing in the plan or this agreement shall be construed
to prevent litigants and jurors from raising in a criminal case or
in a separate action the question of improper peremptory-juror
challenges*
g*

The plan shall be filed with the Court within six months

of this Court's entry of the permanent injunction and decree*
Plaintiff may within 60 days following submission of the plan file
with the Court their position regarding any such proposed plan*
Prior to doing so, the parties shall take reasonable measures to
informally resolve any differences* The Court may then schedule a
hearing on the proposed plan*

At such hearing, the Court may

approve the plan, modify the plan, or direct that Defendant submit
a new plan*

If no comments aire received# the plan shall go Into

immediate effect.
(h)

Defendant may submit new or supplemental plans in the

6

manner set forth in this paragraph as may be needed to implement
the purpose and goals of this agreement.
5•

The Defendant' shal ] maintain d i

11 s < •
» f £ i ce and 11 n the

office of the Clerk of * le Seventh District Court for San Juan
County, the following records:
a.

The District Court

Questionnaire Lists used for the

Seventh District Court for San Juan County for the time period in
which this Court retains jurisdiction over this action.
b.

The Trial Juror Ven i r e ] ists and Tri a] ¥enire lists for

each case in which such lists are generated for the period of time
in which this Court retains jurisdiction over this action,
c.

A record of al 1 rompuleery process used to summons jurors

to jury duty or to complete juror qualification questionnaires*
cl» A record adequately explaining the basis for al 1 excused
and disqualified

111111 \ r H 1"1 u 1 1.1 u 1 "
I '. u period

which this Court

retains jurisdiction.
e.

Each court-approved plan formulated pursuant

le

fiile

Agreement*
£,

Plaintiff, members of the class, and class counsel shall

be'provided with reasonable access to information pertaining to
Defendant's compliance with Llus agreement and the court's decree*
g.

For the first three years that this Agreement and the

Court's Decree is in effect, Defendant shall file ...in annual report
with this Court stating,, w ith specificity, the acts and procedures
undertaken to ensure compliance with this Agreement and the plan or
plans submitted pursuant thereto.
7

6*

If Defendant cannot comply with this agreement, the

Court's decree, or any plan it submits pursuant to this agreement,
then Defendant shall notify Plaintiff and class counsel, and the
Court within 60 days of such occurrence.
7.

Upon the expiration of a reasonable period of time

following the provision of notice to the class, and after resolving
all objections of the class to this Agreement and the proposed
decree, the Court shall enter a decree incorporating this Agreement
therein and restraining and enjoining the parties to abide by the
terms and provisions of this Agreement.

The Court's order will

specify that the defendant-judges are dismissed from this action*
8. Defendant, and all those acting in concert with it, shall,
in regards to jury selection procedures and activities in the
Seventh Judicial District Court for San Juan County, abide by all
applicable laws, regulations, and constitutional provisions*
9*

The requirements of this decree may be modified upon a

showing of a significant change in law or fact*

If at the time

modification is sought the foregoing criteria does not reflect the
current rule, then the parties shall comply with contemporary
standards for-the modification of consent decrees under the rules
of civil procedure*
10.

The parties have made a separate settlement as to the

payment of the costs and attorneys fees incurred by Plaintiff in
bringing this action for the period up to and including the date of
the Court's entry of the permanent injunction and decree.

If the

parties cannot agree as to Plaintiff's costs and fees, the matter

8

shall be snhiiii \ I eel to the l.'om I. for resolution*
11.

The parties, or any member of the plaintiff-class, may

petition the Court, for enforcement of this agreement; the Decree
01 -iiiiy ordi-M MI subsequent orders issued by the Court,

Prior to

petitioning the Court, the parties shall undertake reasonable
efforts to resolve such agreements informally
12.

1 h\.v Agreement of Parties, and any Order of the Court,

shall he binding on the heirs, successors, and assigns of the
parties hereto, including any courts of general juri sdxct :1 on that
may Bucueed » lie present Seventh District Court for San Juan County.
The

parties

recognize

that

there

are

discussions

underway

concerning the division of San Juan County i nto two counties.
Should San Juan County be divided, the Defendant shall be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to formulate a new plan, if necessary.
13. This Court shall retain jurisdiction )ver this action to
enforce Lh*> parties' compliance with the terms of this Agreement
and all orders of the Court

Should the Court's retention of

jurisdiction terminate, Defendant's obligation to dbxde by the
permanent injuuet ion of the Court shall continue.
14.

Nothing in this Agreement constitutes, or shall be

construed as, an admission by Defendant a ol any ol Plaintiff's
alLegations
Dated this 26th
Eric £• Swenson
Jensie L. Anderson
Attorneys for Plaintiff

9

MaycocK
Ellen Maycoc.
David Wright

I*

Attorneys for Defendants

10

Exhibit A, Agreement of Parties
Crank v. Utah Judicial Council 3
IV
I
III2
II1

V4

VI5

Year

Numbers

Percentage£

^.8 Years

Absolute

Comparative

1990

209/599

34.89

51.68

16.79

32.49

1991

242/536

45.15

51.68

6.53

12.64

1992

.161/4 32

7

4 I . fi8

14.41

27. H8

1993

107/300
141/300
138/300
152/300

35.67
47.00
46.00
52.33

51.68
51.68
51.68
51.68

16.01
4.68
5.68
-0.65

30.98
9.06
10.99
-1.26

1994

171/324
226/500

52.78
45.20

51.68
51.68

-1.10
6.48

-i.13
12.54

1995

190/499
238/500

38.08
47.60

51.68
51.68

13.60
4.08

26.32
7.89

1996

170/500

34*00

51.68

17.68

34.21

1

Column II is the number of Native Americans on San Juan
County jury lists, identified in the Agreement of Parties as the
District Court Questionnaire List, as counted by Irene Black for
the years 1990-1996. For the years 1932 to 1970, there were no
Native Americans on any jury lists.
2 Coluinri 1JL1 X S t h e p ercen tage of Native Americans on the San
Juan District Court Questionnaire Lists as counted by Irene Black.
3 U o J L m n n I V i s tJtie percentage of Native Americans aged 18
years and older, in San Juan County, recorded in the 1990 U.S.
Census. The figure, 51.68%, does not take into account any census
under count, nor does it reflect the growth of the Native American
population in San Juan County relative to the non-Native American
population.
4

Column ¥ contains the absolute disparities for Native
Americans. The absolute disparities are calculated by subtracting
Column III from Column IV.
5

Column VI contains the comparative disparities for Native
Americans. The comparative disparities are calculated by dividing
column V by column TV and multiply by 100.

ADDENDUM

Exhibit 2 , Decree

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County

Eric P. Swenson, 3 3171
P.O. Box 940
Monticello, Utah 84535
Telephone: (801) 587-2843

M

OCT 3 0 1996
CLERK OF THE COURT

Jensie L. Anderson, #6467
American Civil Liberties Union
of Utah Foundation, Inc.
# 9 Exchange Place, Suite 715
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-9862

DBVTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SAN JUAN COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LOREN CRANK, J R . ,
Plaintiff,
|

ORDER AND DECREE

V.
UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
Defendant.

C i v i l No. 9 3 0 7 - 2 6
Judge Roth

tBmauBaammmmBssmmswnstneairBfsniigBsssBsssssgs

ssaasrsssx

The Court has reviewed the Agreement of Parties and has found
that injunctive relief shall be granted in accordance with it.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1-

The Court approves and adopts the Agreement of Parties

dated March 26, 1996 which is hereby incorporated by reference into
this Judgment ciiiil Decree.
2.

The parties have filed satisfactory proof showing that

they have provided appropriate notice to the class as required by
the Agreement c >f Parti es

3. The Defendant Utah Judicial Council, its agents, officers,
successors and all persons acting in concert or participating with
it, are hereby ordered to comply with the provisions of the
Agreement of Parties.
4. Defendants Lyle R« Anderson, Bruce K. Halliday, and Bryce
K. Bryner are hereby dismissed from this action, with prejudice.
5.

The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this action

pursuant to Paragraph Thirteen of the Agreement of Parties.

/^Al/^

Dated:

red As

Form:

Ptr Swenson
Jensie L. Anderson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Ellen Haycock
I *
David C. Wright /
Attorneys For Defendant
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit 3, Ruling

SEVFNTH D l S ^ C r CC^PT

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AlfflM?0Rp r g _ r ?G»?
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CLERK
BY _

nF uE c OL °-

„

- ~ -

LOREN CRANK, JR.,
Plaintiff,
RULING ON ATTORNEYS FEES
vs.
Civil No. 9307-26
UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
Defendant.

The Supreme Court of Utah remanded this case on the issue of Crank's claim for attorneys
fees under 42 U.S.C., section 1988, and Judge Anderson's claim for attorney fees under subparts
(2) and (3) of Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b).
The Court willfirstdeal with the issue of Crank's claim for attorneys fees. It must be kept
in mind that Crank lost on appeal on his attempt to have Judge Lyle R. Anderson found in
contempt of court. This was a major thrust of his supplemental proceedings. The Court will,
however, only deal with the issue of Crank's attorneys fees asserted against the Utah Judidal
Council.
The Utah Supreme Court stated:
"Crank asserts that he is entitled to attorney fees under 42 U.S.C., Section
1988(b), which provides, in pertinent part, that 'in any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of section []... 1983 ... of this title, the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs....' Crank argues the district court erred in holding he was
not a prevailing party under this standard and in refusing to award him attorney
fees...."
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The Court then reviewed Arvinger v. Mayor of Baltimore, 31F .3d 196,200-02 (4th Cir.
1994) and quoted the test as follows:
w

...When plaintiffs areforcedto litigate to pres«i^ the relief originally
obtained,1 and where the issues pertaining to both actions are 'inextricably
intermingled,' the plaintiffmay be treated as a prevailing party. Id at 202. Crank's
motion facially meets this test."
"Whether the motion to enforce the Agreonent qualifies Crank for prwailing
party status under section 19S8 presents a separate question, however, to which we
now turn. In Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), the United States Supreme
Court addressed the question of the standards applicable to an award of attorney
fees under section 1988. The Farrar Court prescribed as follows the standard for
determining prevailing party status:
To qualify as a prevailing party? a civilrightsplaintiff must
obtain at least some reKefon the merits of his claim. The plaintiff
must obtain an enforceable judgement against the defendant from
whom fees are sought... or comparable rdiefthrough a consent
decree or settlement... Whatever relief the plaintiff secures
must directly benefit him at the time of the judgement or
settlement... In short, a plaintiff "prevails" when actual relief
on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship
between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a
way that directly benefits the plaintiff/
Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12 (citation omitted.)
Ill this case, it is not clear whether the district court considered this standard."
CRANK v. UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 20 P.3d 316-318 (Utah 2001)
The trial courtfoundthat a baric question was whether or ncrt supplemental proceedings
were necessary. The Agreement wasfiledon May 13,1996 and the order to show cause was
filed September 3,1997 (16 months). Judge David E. Roth tried the issues on supplemental
proceedings, and, among other rulings, made the followingfindingsand rulings on December 11,
1998:
"Thefirstthing I would Hke to say is that in my opinionfromwhat I
have seen of this case and during these last two days, I believe that on both
sides of this case the parties are properly motivated and well intentioned. Both
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trying to solve a similar problem but doing it in different ways from different
prospectives. And while I agree and disagree with both of you to some extent,
I don't see any villains in this courtroom....
It is an agreed fact in this case that the Judicial Council did not meet the
plan timely. The question is, were they justified in not meeting the plan timely.
They have given reasons for their failure to comply....
I think it's commendable that they have tried to work with the Navajo
Nation in solving this problem... I think it's a good thing for the Council to work
with them in solving this problem and Ifindthat that has led to some of the delays
in coming into compliance with the agreement.
Had the Council asked for an extension with that explanation, I very likely
would have granted it.
I understand that Counsel thought that by communicating with Mr. Swenson
they were free to continue to work and try to solve this problem without reporting
to fiie Court. Without submitting apian...
I appreciate efforts to avoid litigation, but that doesn't mean that you can't
get together and submit a stipulated request for an extension. I see no effort, there
is no evidence that that was attempted."
Judge Roth found both parties to be "properly motivated" and "well intentioned." He did
not see "any villains" in the courtroom. He then said, "The question is, were they [the Council]
justified in not meeting the plan timely.H He seemed tofindthat the Council was justified because
he found it commendable that the Council was working with the Navajo Nation to solve the
problem. He found that such work lias led to some of the delays in coming into compliance with
the agreement11 He also stated he would probably have extended the time if the parties had asked
for it. He was bothered that the parties hadn't got together and stipulated to a request for an
extension. He said, "I see no effort, there is no evidence that that was attempted." The
Agreement itself anticipated that an "extension of time in which to bring the jury lists into
compliance" might be needed. See paragraph 4.a. The same paragraph of the Agreement
provided that "Prior to resorting to further litigation, the parties shall engage in reasonable
discussions to resolve their differences informally." The parties exchanged letters but did not

2059

"engage in reasonable discussions to resolve their differences." Both parties were in default in this
provision of the Agreement.
What did Crank accomplish by his motion for supplemental proceedings? Was he a
"prevailing party" under section 1988? Did he "obtain some relief on the merits of his claim?1*
This Court's task on remand is to determine whether, based on the facts and the Farrar standard,
Crank qualifies as a prevailing party." This Court does not believe he qualifies as a pre vailing
party.
The Council filed a "Response Brief on Remand" dated December 17,2001. This Court is
persuaded by the facts, arguments and conclusions contained therein and adopts them as part of
the ruling herein. Many quotesfromthat brief follow without credit being given to the writer of
the brief for them.
The Council determined to obtain the best possible source list of Native Americans—a
tribal enrollment listfromthe Navajo Nation itself which would then be merged with drivers
license and voter lists to form the master jury list A usable list wasfinallyobtained in time for the
second half of 1998. The Council had, admittedly, notfiledrequired status reports with the trial
court. But it was undisputed that plaintiff was updated regularly and often.
The Supreme Court held that the Council's stipulation that it had not filed its reports with
the trial court did not confer prevailing parly status. The Court held that "because the stipulations
did not create any legally-enforceable alteration in the Council's behavior toward Crank, the [trial]
could not employ them as a predicate for afindingthat Crank was a prevailing party" The
Council was watting for the Navajo Nation to sign the Agreement beforefilingit.
The trial court's ruling that the Council take action to increase the percentage of Native
Americans on future inadequate questioimaire lists d c ^ not confer prevailing party staJtus^ The
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ruling did not benefit Crank and it did not alter the relationship already specified under the
Agreement. The Council already had "reasonable discretion to undertake actions and implement
policies which will comply with the goals [of the Agreement] and any planfiledpursuant to
[paragraph 4 of the Agreement].*' The Council could also "submit new or supplemental plans...
as may be needed to implement the purpose and goals of this agreement.** Agreement, paragraphs
6-7 The Council was already obligated to "abide by all applicable laws, regulations, and
constitutional provisions** in connection with its jury selection procedures. Agreement, paragraph
8. Under the Agreement, the Council either had to implement measures to hit the target or seek
relieffromthe trial court. Nothing in the trial court's order changes that The courts ruling,
therefore, did not materially alter the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff/9
The evidence shows that the Council always intended to meet its obligations. The Council
had already hired someone to obtain the Navajo list and to survey the residents along the Arizona
border. Each time a new questionnaire list was to be drawn the Council believed it was about to
get the list it needed to merge with the other source lists. So, there was no need for interim
measures. The Council was already working diligently to satisfy the Agreement, so that Cranks
motion did not alter the Council's behavior. The Council began working with the Navajo Nation
in January of 1996, three months before the case settled. The relationship with the Navajo Nation
is unprecedented. Judge Roth found the Council's eflFort commendable. He also found that "it
was reasonable for [the Council] to focus its efforts on supplementing the mast list for San Juan
County."
The legal enforceability of the trial court's order does not alter the Council's relationship
with, or confer a benefit on Crank. The Agreement was always legally enforceable. So a second
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order with the same instructions changed nothing. The merefilingof the plan as ordered by the
trial court did not confer a benefit on Crank. It was the plan's implementation that conferred the
benefit, not the filing of it with the court. The Council's plan showed results during the second
half of 1998, before the written plan was actually filed. The reforms were already underway and
positive results were obvious at the time of trial and the plan had not been filed. The plan was the
heart of the Agreement, however, the plan was bang implemented before it was filed and Crank
knew what the plan was and what was being done to implement it
The order to file the yearlyreportsalready required under the Agreement did not confer a
benefit on crank. Crank was well aware of the delay in getting the additional source listfromthe
Navajo Nation and he knew the reason it was delayed. Crank was not better informed after the
filing ofthe annual reports than before. Again, he knew the plan and he knew what was being
done to implement it
Crank objects to the arguments put forth by the Council in that brief Some of the Courts
comments on them follow.
Trial in this case was concluded on December 11,1998. The trial court required the
Council to file the order, follow it up with annual compliance reports and take reasonable
measures to correct future jury lists that may have deficient numbers of Native American jurors.
The last provision is the only one that suggests anything new. Even this, however, is not really
new. The Agreement provided in paragraphfour(4) that, "Defendant shall formulate find
implement a plan to assure that Seventh District Court jurors are chosenfromsources reflective
of a crosss section of the community of Jan Juan County/1 Necessarily implied within this torn of
the Agreement is the requirement that defendant take reasonable measures to correct jury lists
that may have deficient numbers of Native American jurors. The Court does notfindtinsto be
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"relief that was obtained through supplemental proceedings. Crank knew the Council's plan
before filing supplemental proceedings and disagreed with it. He had an ongoing dispute with
Judge Lyle R. Anderson. He wanted the trial court and Council to use supplemental sampling to
create a jury list. Crank also knew the percentages of Native Americans on the jury lists being
used prior to the time he filed supplemental proceedings.. Exhibit A of Agreement of the Parties
contains a chart. Column DDL shows the percentage of Native Americans on the San Juan District
Court Questionnaire Lists from 1990 thru the middle of 1996.
1990
34.89
1991
45.15
1992
37.27
1993
45.25
1994
48.99
1995
42.84
1996 (1/2 yr) 34.00

(Up to filing of the Agreement)

Correspondingfiguressince thefilingof the Agreement follow:
1996

45.8

(Last 1/2 of year)

1997

43 2

Up to filing of supplemental proceedings)

The 1990 census showed that 51.68 percent of San Juan County residents were Native
Americans. The Agreement called for the Council to be within five points of the target or 46.68
percent. The percentages support the fact that the Council was conscientiously attempting to
comply with the Agreement at all times. It is also interesting to note that Hfor the years 1932 to
1970, there were no Native Americans on any jury lists.ff
The percentages since may be of interest but are not related to the decision.
1998
1999
2000

45.45
49.70
48.30
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Crank did not obtain anything of substance more after filing supplemental proceedings
than he already had. The fact that the plan and annual compliance reports were filed did not give
him anything new. The only thing the Council was waiting for before film
the Navajo Nation. Had Crank requested thefilingwithout approval of the Nav^o Nation, it
would have been forthcoming.
Crank also argues that nThe Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff prevails when actual
relief on the merits materially alters the legal relationship of the parties by modifying; the
defendant's behavior in a way that direcdy benefits plaintiff" [Farrarcase] This Court does not
differ with the legal principle involved birtdc^ differ with the apphcation that Crank urges.
Crank states that, "The Council needed the prod ofa legal proceeding before taking acti

This

argument is a restatement of the prior argument concerning thefifingof the plan, etc., but based
on a different legal theory. This Court is not persuaded by it
Crank also urges an award of attorney fees based on "the public interest test." There is a
public interest in having Native American jurors chosen in a fair and open jury selection process.
Crank urges "this is a factor only in cases where it is alleged that plaintiffs success was limited in
nature." There are two problems with the apphcation of

to^

First, tins Court has

found that Crank has not prevailed even "ma limited nature. It also appears to be a point which
plaintiff did not preserve on appeal because he "did not adequately brief it in his motion for fees
before the trial courtH Crank, 20 P.3d 319, n.17. Crank, however, insists that his claim is based
solely on "the attorneys fee provisions of 42 U.S.C., section 1988. In either case, the Court rejects
his arguments.
Crank's request for costs and attorneys foes is denied.
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The Court will now deal with the issue of Judge Anderson's claim for attorney fees under
subparts (2) and (3) of Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b).
The Utah Supreme Court held that the subparagraphs of Utah RXiv.P., Rule 11(b)
"... furnish a distinct basis for afindingof a violation of the rule [and] while
bad faith may often be associated with violation of subparagraph (2) and (3)9
such is not a necessary dement. A lawyer may bringfrivolousor inadequately
supported claims merely by failing to exercise the minimal required level of
professional care and judgment." Crank v. Utah Judicial Council, 20 P. 3d 316
Rule 11(b) provides as follows:
"Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion,
other paper to the Court (whether by signing,filing,submitting or later
advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not bang presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfiivolous argument fofr the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence
or, spedficall so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief
Rule 11(c) provides as follows:
Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond,
the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may . . .
impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, lawfirms,or parties that
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation."
At the beginning ofhis brief of December 14,2001, Eric P. Swenson states, "This Court
should view the lengthy redtation of this case made in Judge Andersons brief with caution
because the judge's role in this case is multi-faceted. He is involved as a litigant. He appeared as
a defense witness for the Judicial Council. 1645, Page 225. He assists the Judicial Council in
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implementing the Agreement and Consent Decree, e.g., R. 685-696. He also monitors the
Council's compliance. R. 1621 (Addendum to Judicial Council Plan)."
The Court is asked to use caution in in reviewing Judge Anderson's brief because he is a
"litigant" Judge Anderson is a litigant in much the same way that Mr. Swenson is a litigant.
Neither are really parties to the action. There was an attempt by Mr. Swenson to have Judge
Andersonfoundin contempt and there is an attempt by Judge Anderson to have Mr Swenson
sanctioned.
This Courtfindsthe following to be facts. Judge Anderson was dismissed with prejudice
as a party to the lawsuh on October 27, 1996. He was not a party to the Agreement between
Crank and the Council which had been signed about March of 1996. The Agreement required the
Council to adopt a plan that would, by January 31,1997, provide jury questionnaire lists. On July
18,1997, Mr. Swenson, acting for a criminal defendant not a party to this proceeding, challei^ed
the composition of the questionnaire lists for the second half of 1997. Judge Anderson found that
the 44.6% of the potential jurors were American Indians. He further found that the disparity of
7.08% was not of constitutional dimension and denied the motion. On September 3,1997, Crank
filed a motion to enforce the consent decree. Judge Anderson was included in the motion. Mr.
Swenson suggested that, "The Court should consider whether Judge Anderson should be jailed
for what can only be described asflagrantlyracist conduct" Judge Anderson was never made a
party to these supplemental proceedings. The motion added Judge Anderson to the case caption
designating him as a "contemnor." One of the reasons Mr. Swenson referred to Judge Anderson's
conduct as "flagrantly racist" was because Judge Anderson had ruled against him in the July 18,
1997 case. Judge Anderson filed a motion to strike which was heard on August 14,1998. The
trial judge granted the motion to strike Judge Anderson In doing so he said, "Ifindthat Judge
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Anderson has no affirmative duty that arises out of this Agreement. I alsofindthat he could only
be in contempt of this Court under the Agreement if he did something tofrustratethe Council's
efforts to comply with the Agreement. Ifindno evidence of that.... Quitefrankly,I don't think it's
even a close call to grant the Motion to Strike.w This Court also has reviewed the files and
records andfindsno action on the part of Judge Anderson which would indicate wrongdoing of
any kind. After the trial court granted Judge Anderson's motion to strike, Crank abandoned his
claim tofindthe Council in contempt of court. A trial was held on the other issues on December
10-11,1998. Crank appealed the rulings of the trial court denying his request for attorney fees
against the Council and the motion to strike Judge Anderson and the refusal to find him in
contempt of court. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the motion to strike Judge Anderson and
the refusal to hold him in contempt of court.
Mr Swenson violated Rule 1 l(bXl). He was motivated in part by the rulings Judge
Anderson made against him in the case tried on July 17,1997. This is when he describes Judge
Anderson's conduct as "flagrantly racist.M This does not become apparent until August 14,1998,
when the trial court ruled against him, yet he continued to pursue contempt against Judge
Anderson. The purpose to harrass and embarrass then becomes apparent.
Mr. Swenson violated Rule 1 l(bX2). He never argued that the court should extend,
modify or reverse the law or establish new law. He contended that the existing law warranted the
relief he sought. The Agreement imposed no affirmative duty on Judge Anderson to construct an
appropriate master jury list. The Council was obligated to construct the list. Judge Anderson was
bound to use the list. Judge Anderson was not a party to this action and Mr. Swenson took no
action to make him a party. All action against Judge Anderson should have been abandoned after
the August 14,1998, hearing wherein the trial court granted Judge Anderson's motion to strike.
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At that time it was clear that Judge Anderson was not "flagrantly racist/1 was not a party to the
Agreement and had no duty with respect to constracting the master jury list. If anyone should
have been found in contempt of court it should have been someone working for the Council.
Even this was not warranted because the Council had been acting in good faith throughout the
proceedings. Mr. Swenson continued, however, to assort that Judge Anderson had an obligation
to enforce the Agreement.
Mr. Swenson violated Rule 1 l(bX3). This paragraph requires counsel to certify that his
allegations and contentions are supported by evidence. It was clearn that Judge Anderson was
not a party to the Agreement No sworn facts indicated that Judge Anderson had violated the
Agreement or had made an attempt to interfere with its implementation. The Supreme Court
noted that, "there are no concrete factual
any actions that could be remotely continued as hampering the Council's efforts."
The Courtfindsthat the attorneys fees outlined by counsel for Judge Anderson to be
reasonable in the amount of $5,931.24 for pre-appeal work and $11,402.90 for appeal and
post-appeal work, or, a total attorneys fees of $17,255.00 as ofNovember 16,2001. The Court
alsofindsthem to be necessary.
The Courtfindsthat counsel for the Plaintiffhas violated Rule 11(b), subparts (1), (2) and
(3) and should be sanctioned therefor The Court is aware of the many ways there are to sanction
a lawyer, but in this case the most effective method is the pocketbook. As a sanction, Eric P.
Swenson is ordered to pay to Anderson & Anderson, PC. one-half of Judge Lyle R. Anderson's
attorneys feesfor appeal and post-appeal work in the amount of $5,701,45. The sanction
imposed is not based upon some formula but is the judgement of the Court that it is reasonable. It
is meant as a sanction and the feet that Judge Anderson is notreimbursedfor aU of his attorneys
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fees is not a consideration. It was limited to the appeal and thereafter because the trial court
found both parties to be "well-motivated" and "well intentioned" at the trial on December 11,
1998.
This Courtfindsthat the ACLU played a relatively small part in the supplemental
proceedings. Their counsel should not be sanctioned.
In summary, Crank is denied attorneyfeesfromthe Utah Judicial Council. Judge Lyle R.
Anderson is granted attorneys fees against Eric P. Swenson in the amount of $5,701.45.
Counsel for the Utah Judicial Council is directed to draw a formal less wordy judgment.
Dated this 6th day of Fe
//

iRNAfet, SeftbVJudge

/

I certify that on the 6th da^^^^Bja^% 2002,1 caused to be served via the U. S. Mail a
copy of the foregoing to:
Eric P. Swenson
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 58798
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158
David C. Wright
White &Mabey,LJLC
265 East 100 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Daniel G. Anderson
Anderson & Anderson, P.C.
81 East 100 South
Monticeflo, Utah 84535

ADDENDUM
Exhibit 4, Rule 11

Rule 11
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lines and signatures in permanent black or
blue ink.
Paragraph (f). The changes in this paragraph
make it clear that the clerk must accept all
papers for filing, even though they may violate
the rule, but the clerk may require counsel to
substitute conforming for nonconforming papers. The clerk is given discretion to waive
requirements of the rule for parties who are not
represented by counsel; for good cause shown,

the court may relieve parties of the obligation
to comply with the rule or any part of it.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment added the last sentence in Subdivision
(a).
The 2000 amendment inserted "(and commissioner if applicable)" after "judge* near the end
of the first sentence in Subdivision (a),
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (c)
of this rule are similar to Rule 10, F.R.C.R

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Exhibits.
—Use as pleadings.
Cited.
Exhlblts

exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose
of supplying necessary material averments nor
can die content of the exhibit be taken as part
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983).

-

—Use as pleadings.
While an exhibit may be considered as a part
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Cited in State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646
J
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of a pleading to clarify or explain the same, an
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am, Jar, 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading
§§ 23 to 56, 69, 117.
C.J.S. — 71 C.JJS. Pleading §§ 5,9,63 to 98,
371 to 375, 418.

AJLR. — Propriety of attaching photographs
to a pleading, 33 AX.R.3d 322.
Propriety and effect of use of fictitious name
of plaintiff in federal court, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 369.

Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers;
representations to court; sanctions.
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or,
if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each
paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken
unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the
attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or
other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of
the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the
court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject
to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the
attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are
responsible for the violation.
(1) How initiated.
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made
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separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule
5, but shall not befiledwith or presented to the court unless, within 21 days
after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe),
the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not
withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to
Hie parly prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees
incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circumstances,
a law firm may be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its
partners, members, and employees.
(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and
directing an attorney, lawfirm,or party to show cause why it has not violated
subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this
rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in
subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives
of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to
the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses
incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for
a violation of subdivision (bX2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless
the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or
settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose
attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the
sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do
not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
(Amended effective Sept. 4,1985; April 1,1997.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1997
amendments conform state Rule 11 with federal Rule 11. One difference between the roles
concerns holding a law firm jointly responsible
for violations by a member of the firm. Federal
Rule IKcXIXA) states: "Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly
responsible for violations committed by its
partners, associates, and employees." Under
the federal rule, joint responsibility is presumed unless the judge determines not to impose joint responsibility. State Rule IKcXIXA)
provides: «ln appropriate anmmstances, a law
firm may be held jointly responsible for viola-

turns committed by its partners, members, and
employees." Under the state rule, joint responsibility is not presumed, and the judge may
impose joint responsibility in appropriate orcumstances* What constitutes appropriate orcumstances is left to the discretion of the judge,
hut might include: repeated violations, espedaily after earlier sanctions; firm-wide
sanctionable practices; or a sanctionable practice approved by a supervising attorney and
committed by a subordinate,
Compfler'a Notes. — This rule is substan^
^ ^ to R u k j l h F R C p

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Adoption proceeding.
Amendment of complaint.
Amount of sanctions.
Appeals.
Due process.
Imposition of sanctions.
Nature of duty imposed.
Reasonable inquiry.

Sanctions not warranted.
Sanctions warranted.
violation.
—Question of law.
—Sanctions.
Attorney fees.
—Standard.
Cited.

